PhantomYerra v45.1.0
Universal AI-Agentic Security Assessment Platform - Complete Methodology
This document is the authoritative reference for every assessment capability in PhantomYerra. It covers all attack surfaces, every scanning engine, the AI-agentic orchestration model, exploitation workflows, and reporting methodology. Use the sidebar navigation or the search bar to locate any topic.
1. Introduction
1.1 What Is PhantomYerra
PhantomYerra is the world's first Universal AI-Agentic Security Assessment Platform. It consolidates the work of an entire penetration testing team into a single desktop application powered by an autonomous AI orchestrator. Rather than running individual tools one at a time and manually correlating results, PhantomYerra's AI core plans an engagement strategy, selects and executes the appropriate scanning and exploitation engines in parallel, adapts to findings in real time, chains discoveries into full attack paths, and produces evidence-grade professional reports: all with a single confirmation from the operator.
The platform covers more than 25 distinct attack surfaces: web applications, network infrastructure, cloud posture, mobile applications, IoT and embedded systems, OT/ICS/SCADA, AI/LLM models, firmware, reverse engineering, wireless, automotive, medical devices, robotics, and more. Each surface is serviced by purpose-built assessment engines branded under the Yerra product family (YerraScan, YerraRecon, YerraInject, and others), ensuring a unified experience regardless of the underlying technical depth.
PhantomYerra runs as an Electron desktop application backed by a FastAPI Python scan engine. The React 18 frontend communicates with the Python backend over local HTTP. All tool invocations, AI decisions, and evidence capture happen locally on the operator's machine. The only external communication is with the AI API (for agentic orchestration) and the licensing server (for activation). In air-gapped mode, a local Ollama model replaces the external AI API, ensuring zero data leaves the machine.
1.2 AI-Agentic Architecture Overview
At PhantomYerra's core is an agentic AI orchestrator that operates using a tool-use (function-calling) model. The AI receives the target definition and engagement scope, then autonomously invokes assessment functions, reads their output, makes decisions about next steps, and chains findings together. The human operator confirms the engagement plan once; after that, the AI runs to completion without further intervention.
The architecture follows this flow:
- Target & Scope Definition - The user specifies the target (URL, IP range, application, code repository, etc.) and defines the scope (which surfaces to test, environment type, intensity level).
- AI Plan Generation - The orchestrator analyzes the target, fingerprints technologies, maps the attack surface, and generates a prioritized attack plan ranked by severity and exploitability.
- Human Confirmation - The operator reviews the plan and confirms with a single action ("proceed" or adjusts scope). This is the only mandatory human interaction.
- Autonomous Execution - The AI dispatches scanning engines in parallel, monitors results in real time, and adapts strategy based on discoveries. If SQL injection is found, the AI automatically pivots to test authentication bypass and remote code execution paths.
- Finding Chaining - Every discovery is connected to an attack graph. An informational finding (open port) becomes the first link in a chain leading to exploitation (service enumeration, default credentials, admin access, remote code execution).
- Evidence Collection - Raw HTTP requests/responses, terminal output, screenshots, and extracted data are captured for every finding. Evidence is SHA-256 hashed and timestamped.
- Report Generation - The AI writes professional penetration testing narratives with executive summaries, technical details, proof-of-concept steps, and remediation guidance.
1.3 Three Scan Modes
| Mode | Description | AI Involvement | Best For |
|---|---|---|---|
| Automated AI | Full agentic mode. AI plans, executes, adapts, and reports autonomously. Human confirms once. | Maximum: AI drives all decisions | Full penetration tests, compliance assessments, red team emulation |
| Semi-Automated | AI assists with tool selection and finding analysis, but the operator drives the engagement flow and confirms each major phase. | High: AI advises, human decides | Targeted testing, vulnerability validation, audit-controlled environments |
| Manual | Direct tool invocation. The operator selects specific engines, configures parameters, and reviews raw output. AI provides on-demand analysis when requested. | On-demand only | Specialist testing, custom payload development, forensic investigation |
1.4 Intensity Levels
| Level | Description | Network Impact |
|---|---|---|
| Passive | No active probing. OSINT, DNS enumeration, certificate transparency, public data sources only. Zero packets sent to target. | None |
| Normal | Standard scanning with rate limiting. Service detection, web crawling, vulnerability scanning with safe checks only (no exploitation). | Low - indistinguishable from normal web traffic |
| Aggressive | Full-speed scanning with exploitation enabled. Brute-force, fuzzing, payload injection, and active exploitation of discovered vulnerabilities. | Moderate to High - may trigger IDS/IPS |
| Full | Maximum intensity. All payloads, all techniques, all surfaces. Includes denial-of-service resilience testing (with scope confirmation). Designed for isolated test environments. | High - equivalent to a full adversary simulation |
1.5 How the AI Orchestrator Drives Engagements
The AI orchestrator uses Claude as its reasoning engine with tool-use function calling. Each assessment engine is exposed as a callable function. The AI receives the engagement context (target, scope, environment, findings so far) and decides which function to call next based on the current state of the attack graph. Every assessment tool in PhantomYerra is a registered function that the AI can invoke, receive results from, and use those results to inform its next decision.
The orchestrator maintains a live attack graph: a directed graph where nodes represent findings and edges represent exploitation paths. Every new finding is evaluated for chaining opportunities: Can this open port be used to reach an internal service? Does this information disclosure reveal credentials that unlock another surface? Does this low-severity misconfiguration enable a critical attack when combined with another finding?
The orchestrator also implements retry logic with alternative approaches. If a standard SQL injection payload is blocked by a WAF, the AI generates WAF-bypass variants, tries different encoding schemes, or pivots to a different injection point entirely. It never silently fails; every attempt, success, or confirmed-not-exploitable result is logged and available for review.
Privacy is enforced at the API boundary: a Privacy Filter anonymizes all target-specific data (URLs, IPs, company names) before sending context to the AI API, using reference tokens that are restored locally on response. In air-gapped environments, a local Ollama model handles all reasoning with zero external communication.
2. Getting Started
2.1 Configuring Targets and Scope
Every engagement begins with target configuration. PhantomYerra supports the following target types:
- Single URL - A web application endpoint (e.g.,
https://app.example.com) - Domain - A domain name for subdomain enumeration, DNS reconnaissance, and web application discovery
- IP Address - A single host for network-level testing
- CIDR Range - A network range (e.g.,
10.0.0.0/24) for infrastructure assessments - Source Code Repository - A local path or Git URL for SAST, SCA, secrets scanning, and IaC analysis
- Mobile Application - An APK, IPA, or connected device for mobile testing
- Firmware Image - A binary firmware file for extraction and analysis
- API Specification - An OpenAPI/Swagger, GraphQL schema, or WSDL definition for API testing
- Cloud Account: AWS, Azure, or GCP credentials for cloud posture assessment
- OT/ICS Endpoint - Modbus, S7, DNP3, or EtherNet/IP addresses for industrial testing
- AI/LLM Endpoint - An API endpoint for AI model security testing
Scope is defined through surface selection: the operator checks which attack surfaces to include. Each surface can be individually enabled or disabled, and the intensity level can be set globally or per-surface. Scope enforcement is mandatory: every tool invocation verifies that the target falls within the authorized scope before executing.
2.2 License Activation
PhantomYerra requires a valid license to operate. On first launch, the application prompts for a license key. The key is validated against the licensing server. Once validated, the license is cached locally for subsequent launches. Internet connectivity is required for license validation; there is no offline grace period. A background poll every five minutes detects license changes (module additions, removals, or revocation) without requiring a restart.
License tiers control which surfaces and features are available:
- Professional - All web, network, SAST, SCA, and reporting features
- Enterprise - All Professional features plus cloud, OT/ICS, mobile, AI/LLM, and team features
- Ultimate - Full access to every surface, red team operations, automotive, medical device, and robotics testing
2.3 AI Key Setup
PhantomYerra's AI-agentic mode requires a Claude API key from Anthropic. The key can be provided in two ways:
- Automatic (recommended) - If the license server includes an AI API key in the license record, it is used automatically. No manual configuration needed.
- Manual - Navigate to Settings, then AI Configuration, and enter a Claude API key. The key is encrypted with AES-256-GCM and stored locally at
data/ai_keys.enc. It is never transmitted in plaintext or logged.
PhantomYerra validates the key on startup with a minimal API call. If the key is invalid or credits are exhausted, the application falls back to Semi-Automated and Manual modes: all scanning engines remain fully functional without AI orchestration.
The platform supports alternative AI providers in priority order: Anthropic Claude (primary), OpenAI GPT-4o, Google Gemini, and local Ollama models (deepseek-r1) for air-gapped environments.
2.4 Setting Environment Type
| Environment | Behavior |
|---|---|
live_production | Strictest safety controls. No destructive tests, no DoS payloads, no data modification. Read-only exploitation verification where possible. Rate limiting enforced. |
staging | Standard testing. Full exploitation enabled with automatic rollback of any changes. Data extraction limited to proof-of-concept volumes. |
test_lab | No restrictions. Full exploitation, DoS testing, brute force with unlimited attempts, data extraction without limits. For isolated environments only. |
2.5 First Scan Walkthrough
- Launch PhantomYerra and activate your license on the License screen.
- From the Home screen, select New Assessment.
- Enter the target URL (e.g.,
https://testapp.example.com). - Select surfaces: check Web Application, Reconnaissance, and optionally Network.
- Set environment type to staging (or test_lab if fully isolated).
- Set intensity to Normal for the first run.
- Select scan mode: Automated AI for a hands-free engagement.
- Click Launch Assessment. The AI will generate an attack plan for your review.
- Review the plan and click Confirm & Proceed.
- Monitor progress on the Scan Dashboard. Findings appear in real time as the AI discovers and validates them.
- When the assessment completes, navigate to Reports to generate a professional PDF or DOCX report.
3. Web Application Testing
Web application testing is PhantomYerra's deepest and most full attack surface. It encompasses vulnerability scanning, fuzzing, crawling, parameter discovery, XSS detection, CMS-specific analysis, visual reconnaissance, business logic testing, and TLS analysis. The AI orchestrator coordinates all engines to build a complete picture of the application's security posture. The surface registry assigns each web engine a priority; the orchestrator runs them in parallel where possible and feeds results between engines automatically.
3.1 YerraScan Engine (Priority 1)
YerraScan Engine is PhantomYerra's primary vulnerability scanning engine. It performs template-based vulnerability detection using a continuously updated library of over 8,000 vulnerability checks covering CVEs, misconfigurations, default credentials, exposed panels, information disclosure, and more.
What information is needed to start
- Target URL(s) or a list of URLs (one per line, or piped from the reconnaissance phase)
- Optional: specific template tags to focus (e.g.,
cve,misconfig,exposure,default-login) - Intensity level (controls rate limiting and template aggressiveness)
- Authenticated scan credentials (if testing behind login - cookies or bearer tokens)
How the test works step-by-step
- Template Selection - Based on target technology fingerprinting, the engine selects relevant templates. A WordPress site triggers CMS-specific templates; a Java application triggers Struts/Spring templates; an IIS server triggers ASP.NET templates.
- Request Generation - For each template, HTTP requests are crafted with specific paths, parameters, headers, and payloads defined in the template. Request ordering is optimized to reduce total round trips.
- Response Matching - Responses are analyzed against multiple matchers: status codes, body content patterns (regex and keyword), header patterns, response time differentials, and DSL expressions that combine multiple conditions.
- Severity Classification - Matches are classified by severity (Critical, High, Medium, Low, Info) based on the template definition, CVSS scoring, and whether the CVE appears in the CISA KEV catalog.
- Evidence Capture - Full HTTP request/response pairs are captured and SHA-256 hashed as evidence for every confirmed finding.
- Deduplication - Duplicate findings across multiple URLs are consolidated, with each affected URL listed in the finding detail.
What findings it produces
CVE vulnerabilities with CVSS scores, misconfiguration findings (exposed admin panels, debug endpoints, directory listings), default credential detections, technology exposure (version disclosure, stack traces), and information leakage (API keys in responses, internal IPs, backup files). Each finding includes the matched template identifier for traceability.
How to review results
Each finding includes: severity rating, CVE ID (if applicable), the matched template ID, full HTTP request/response evidence, a description of the vulnerability, business impact assessment, and remediation guidance. Findings are grouped by severity in the Scan Dashboard and can be filtered by category, severity, or affected URL. Clicking a finding opens the evidence viewer with side-by-side request/response display.
How to decide whether to exploit
The AI orchestrator evaluates each finding's exploitability: Is a public exploit available? Does the environment type permit exploitation? What additional data or access could be gained? If the finding is exploitable and within scope, the AI proceeds automatically. If exploitation would be destructive (data modification, service disruption), it pauses for operator confirmation in live_production environments.
Example findings
| Finding | Severity | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Apache Struts RCE (CVE-2023-50164) | CRITICAL | HTTP response showing command execution output from crafted Content-Type header |
| Exposed GitLab CI/CD Token | HIGH | Token extracted from accessible /.gitlab-ci.yml file |
| Directory Listing Enabled | MEDIUM | Full file listing at /uploads/ showing user-uploaded content |
| Server Version Disclosure | LOW | Server: Apache/2.4.51 header revealing exact server version |
3.2 YerraBrute - Web Fuzzing Orchestrator (Priority 2)
YerraBrute is PhantomYerra's web fuzzing orchestrator that discovers hidden content, directories, files, virtual hosts, and parameters through intelligent wordlist-based probing. It coordinates three complementary fuzzing engines for maximum coverage, each specializing in a different aspect of content discovery.
FfufAdapter - Fast Web Fuzzer
The primary fuzzing engine handles directory/file discovery, virtual host enumeration, parameter fuzzing, and POST data fuzzing. It supports filtering responses by status code, response size, word count, line count, and regex patterns. Custom wordlists are selected based on the target technology stack (e.g., PHP-specific wordlists for PHP applications, ASP-specific for IIS/ASP.NET targets). It operates at high speed with configurable concurrency and automatic calibration to find the optimal request rate.
GobusterAdapter - Directory Buster
Focused on directory and DNS brute-forcing. Excels at deep recursive directory discovery with configurable depth levels. Supports extensions-based discovery (e.g., .php, .asp, .jsp, .bak, .old, .conf, .zip, .tar.gz). Handles stateful cookies for authenticated directory enumeration.
FeroxbusterAdapter - Recursive Content Discovery
Recursive forced browsing engine. Automatically discovers directories and then recursively fuzzes within each discovered directory. Handles auto-calibration of response filtering, making it effective against applications that return custom 404 pages with varying content lengths.
What information is needed
- Target URL (base URL to fuzz against)
- Wordlist selection (auto-selected based on technology fingerprint, or manually chosen)
- Extensions to append (auto-detected from technology fingerprint or manually specified)
- Recursion depth (default: 3 levels)
- Rate limit (requests per second; default adapts to target responsiveness)
- Authentication tokens if testing behind login
How the test works step-by-step
- Technology fingerprinting determines which wordlists and extensions to use.
- Baseline request captures the target's default 404 response signature (size, word count, status code).
- Fuzzing begins with the primary wordlist, appending configured extensions to each word.
- Responses are compared to the 404 baseline; significant deviations indicate discovered content.
- Discovered directories trigger recursive fuzzing at deeper levels.
- Results are deduplicated and classified by content type (directory, file, backup, config, admin panel).
How results are reviewed
Discovered paths are categorized by type: directories, files, backup files, configuration files, admin panels, API endpoints, and hidden functionality. Each discovery includes the HTTP status code, response size, and a content preview. Critical discoveries (backup files containing credentials, exposed admin panels, configuration files with secrets) are flagged with appropriate severity and feed into the attack graph.
Example findings
| Path | Status | Severity | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
/admin/ | 200 | HIGH | Unauthenticated admin panel access |
/backup/db.sql.bak | 200 | CRITICAL | Database backup file downloadable, contains credentials |
/.env | 200 | CRITICAL | Environment file with database credentials and API keys |
/api/v1/internal/debug | 200 | MEDIUM | Internal debug endpoint exposed with stack trace information |
/.git/HEAD | 200 | CRITICAL | Exposed Git repository, entire source code extractable |
3.3 YerraTLS: TLS/SSL Security Analyzer (Priority 3)
YerraTLS performs full TLS/SSL analysis including protocol version support, cipher suite enumeration, certificate chain validation, key exchange strength, known vulnerabilities (POODLE, BEAST, CRIME, Heartbleed, ROBOT, Lucky13), HSTS configuration, certificate transparency log presence, and OCSP stapling status. It tests every TLS-enabled endpoint discovered during the reconnaissance phase.
What information is needed
- Target hostname and port (default: 443; also tests 8443, 8080 with TLS)
- No authentication required: TLS analysis uses the public handshake
How the test works
- Initiates TLS handshakes with each supported protocol version (SSLv3, TLS 1.0, 1.1, 1.2, 1.3) to determine which are accepted.
- Enumerates all accepted cipher suites for each protocol version.
- Analyzes the certificate chain: validity dates, key sizes, signature algorithms, issuer chain, SAN entries.
- Tests for specific vulnerabilities by sending crafted handshake messages (e.g., Heartbleed uses a malformed heartbeat request).
- Checks security headers: HSTS (max-age, includeSubdomains, preload), Expect-CT.
What findings it produces
| Finding | Severity |
|---|---|
| SSLv3 enabled (POODLE vulnerable) | HIGH |
| RC4 cipher suite accepted | MEDIUM |
| Certificate expired 47 days ago | HIGH |
| HSTS header missing | LOW |
| TLS 1.3 supported with strong cipher suites | INFO |
3.4 YerraParamDiscover - Hidden Parameter Finder (Priority 4)
YerraParamDiscover identifies hidden, undocumented, and debug parameters in web applications. Many applications accept parameters that are not visible in the UI or documentation but are processed by the backend. These hidden parameters can enable debug modes, bypass authentication, access admin functionality, or reveal internal data structures.
How it works
- Sends a baseline request to the target URL and captures the response signature (size, word count, headers, status code).
- Iterates through a wordlist of common parameter names (debug, admin, test, verbose, internal, token, secret, key, api_key, and thousands more), appending each to the request.
- Compares each response against the baseline - significant deviations (different status code, changed response size, new headers, different content) indicate a recognized parameter.
- Discovered parameters are tested with various values (boolean true/false, numeric 0/1, strings, special characters) to determine their function.
- Parameters that enable debug output, bypass security checks, or reveal internal data are flagged with appropriate severity.
Example findings
| Parameter | Value | Effect | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
debug | true | Enables verbose error output with stack traces and SQL queries | HIGH |
admin | 1 | Bypasses authorization check, grants admin view of all users | CRITICAL |
_format | json | Returns raw JSON response including internal metadata fields | MEDIUM |
test | 1 | Disables rate limiting on the endpoint | MEDIUM |
3.5 YerraSurface - Web Server Scanner (Priority 5)
YerraSurface performs full web server analysis including server software identification, dangerous HTTP methods (PUT, DELETE, TRACE), default file detection, outdated server components, SSL/TLS configuration issues, and server-level misconfigurations. It complements application-level scanning by focusing on the web server infrastructure layer.
What it tests
- Over 6,700 potentially dangerous files and programs across all major web servers
- Outdated versions of over 1,250 web server software variants
- Version-specific vulnerabilities on 270+ server types
- Server configuration issues: directory listing, WebDAV methods, TRACE/TRACK methods, CORS misconfiguration
- SSL/TLS issues: expired certificates, weak ciphers, protocol downgrade opportunities
- HTTP security headers: missing Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy
- Default installation pages, README files, CHANGELOG files that leak version information
3.6 YerraCMS - WordPress Security Scanner (Priority 6)
YerraCMS is a dedicated WordPress security assessment engine. It identifies WordPress installations, enumerates installed plugins and themes (including version numbers), tests for known vulnerabilities in each component, performs user enumeration, and tests authentication mechanisms including XML-RPC brute-force amplification.
How it works step-by-step
- WordPress Detection - Identifies WordPress through meta generators,
wp-contentpaths, REST API endpoints (/wp-json/), andxmlrpc.phppresence. - Plugin Enumeration - Discovers installed plugins through multiple methods: passive detection from page source, aggressive probing of known plugin paths, REST API queries, and readme.txt version extraction.
- Theme Enumeration - Identifies active and inactive themes via stylesheet references, template detection, and
style.cssversion headers. - Vulnerability Cross-Reference - Each detected plugin/theme version is cross-referenced against vulnerability databases for known CVEs, including SQL injection, XSS, RCE, and file upload vulnerabilities.
- User Enumeration - Discovers WordPress user accounts through author archives (
/?author=1), REST API user endpoint (/wp-json/wp/v2/users), and login error oracle (different error messages for valid vs invalid usernames). - Authentication Testing - Tests for weak passwords against enumerated users using dictionary attacks, XML-RPC multicall brute-force amplification (testing hundreds of passwords per request), and default credentials.
3.7 YerraInfoGather - Web Information Harvester (Priority 7)
YerraInfoGather crawls web applications to extract sensitive information including API keys, tokens, email addresses, internal IP addresses, AWS/GCP/Azure credentials, database connection strings, JWT secrets, and other secrets embedded in HTML source, JavaScript files, and API responses. It operates alongside YerraCrawler but focuses specifically on information extraction rather than URL discovery. Every extracted piece of sensitive data is tested for liveness where applicable (e.g., testing if an extracted AWS key is still active).
3.8 YerraCrawler (Priority 8)
YerraCrawler is a high-performance web crawling engine that maps the full application structure by following links, parsing JavaScript, extracting URLs from comments and source code, and building a complete site map. Unlike traditional crawlers, it executes JavaScript to discover dynamically generated content and single-page application routes.
How it works
- Seeds the crawl from the target URL and any previously discovered endpoints from reconnaissance.
- Follows all links (anchor tags, form actions, JavaScript redirects, fetch/XHR calls).
- Extracts URLs from inline JavaScript, CSS files, HTML comments, and meta tags.
- Respects scope boundaries: only crawls within the defined target domain(s).
- Outputs a complete URL list with parameter names, HTTP methods, and content types.
The crawler output feeds directly into other engines: discovered URLs are passed to YerraScan for vulnerability scanning, to YerraBrute for parameter fuzzing, and to the DAST engine for active testing.
3.9 YerraXSS - Cross-Site Scripting Specialist (Priority 9)
YerraXSS is a dedicated XSS vulnerability detection and exploitation engine. While the general DAST engine tests for XSS as part of its broader scan, YerraXSS provides specialized deep analysis including DOM-based XSS detection, blind XSS verification through out-of-band callbacks, and context-aware payload generation for various rendering contexts (HTML, attribute, JavaScript, URL, CSS).
Payload generation methodology
The engine analyzes how user input is reflected in the response. Based on the reflection context, it generates targeted payloads:
- HTML context:
<script>tags, event handlers (onerror,onload,onfocus),<img>/<svg>/<details>with event attributes - Attribute context: Attribute escape sequences, event handler injection, JavaScript protocol URLs
- JavaScript context: String break-out, template literal injection (
${}), prototype chain manipulation - URL context:
javascript:protocol, data URIs, URL encoding bypasses
The engine automatically tests WAF bypass techniques: Unicode normalization, HTML entity encoding, double encoding, null byte injection, case randomization, and polyglot payloads. It generates hundreds of payload variants per injection point and tests them with an intelligent backoff strategy to avoid rate limiting.
How many exploitation attempts
The engine tests up to 300 payload variants per injection point. It begins with simple payloads and progressively escalates to more complex WAF-bypass techniques. Testing terminates early when a successful payload is confirmed or when all variants are exhausted.
Confirming exploitation
Reflected XSS is confirmed by verifying that the injected payload appears in the response unencoded within an executable context. Stored XSS is confirmed by injecting a payload, navigating to the storage/display page, and verifying execution. Blind XSS is verified using an out-of-band callback server that logs the execution with source URL, cookies, and DOM content.
Confirming NOT exploitable
An injection point is marked not vulnerable only after: (1) all standard payloads tested across all contexts, (2) all encoding/bypass variants exhausted, (3) DOM-based analysis completed, (4) OOB callback monitoring concluded. Evidence includes the list of tested payloads and the sanitization behavior observed.
3.10 YerraPatternMatch: URL Pattern Extractor (Priority 10)
YerraPatternMatch extracts interesting URLs from web crawling output using pattern-matching rules. It identifies URLs that contain potential injection points (parameters likely vulnerable to SQLi, XSS, SSRF, LFI, RCE), debug endpoints, file upload handlers, and redirect parameters. These extracted URLs are prioritized for further testing by the AI orchestrator, ensuring the most promising attack vectors are explored first.
3.11 YerraVisual - Web Screenshot Engine (Priority 11)
YerraVisual captures screenshots of web pages for visual reconnaissance and evidence collection. It processes lists of URLs in parallel, rendering each page in a headless browser and capturing a full-page screenshot. Screenshots are used for: (1) evidence in reports proving access to admin panels, login pages, and sensitive content; (2) visual similarity analysis to identify default installations and known software; (3) technology fingerprinting from visual layout patterns.
3.12 YerraLogicTest - Business Logic Vulnerability Scanner (Priority 12)
YerraLogicTest performs automated business logic vulnerability testing: a category that traditional scanners cannot detect because the vulnerabilities exist in the application's intended functionality rather than in technical implementation flaws. This engine requires authenticated access and understanding of the application's workflow.
Vulnerability classes tested
- IDOR (Insecure Direct Object Reference) - Tests whether modifying resource IDs (user IDs, order numbers, document references) provides access to other users' data. The engine systematically increments, decrements, and randomizes identifiers.
- BOLA (Broken Object-Level Authorization) - Verifies that API endpoints enforce authorization checks per object, not just per endpoint. Tests with different user sessions to confirm isolation.
- BFLA (Broken Function-Level Authorization) - Tests whether regular users can access administrative functions by directly calling admin API endpoints discovered through crawling or API documentation.
- Race Conditions - Sends concurrent requests to test for time-of-check-to-time-of-use (TOCTOU) vulnerabilities in financial transactions, coupon redemption, voting, inventory operations, and similar state-changing operations.
- Mass Assignment - Tests whether sending additional fields in API requests (e.g.,
"role":"admin","isVerified":true) modifies protected attributes. - Workflow Bypass - Tests whether multi-step processes (payment, approval, verification) can be bypassed by skipping intermediate steps or replaying final-step requests directly.
- JWT Manipulation - Tests for algorithm confusion (RS256 to HS256),
nonealgorithm acceptance, key brute-force on weak secrets, and claim tampering (changingsub,role,expclaims). - Price Manipulation - Tests whether client-side price values, discount codes, or quantity fields are trusted by the server without validation.
4. Network Security
Network security testing covers the infrastructure layer: port scanning, service enumeration, protocol analysis, Active Directory attacks, lateral movement, and network-level exploitation. PhantomYerra coordinates multiple complementary engines through the NetworkScanOrchestrator to build a full network map and identify exploitable services.
4.1 YerraPortScanner - Port Discovery Engine (Priority 1)
The primary port scanning engine that coordinates fast SYN-based discovery with detailed service enumeration. It first performs a rapid sweep of all 65,535 TCP ports using asynchronous connection probes, then hands discovered open ports to the service detection phase for banner grabbing and version identification. The two-stage approach combines speed (full port sweep in seconds) with depth (detailed service analysis of every open port).
4.2 YerraVPN: VPN Security Scanner (Priority 2)
YerraVPN tests VPN concentrators and remote access gateways for known vulnerabilities, weak configurations, and authentication bypass. Covers IPsec/IKE, SSL VPN (Pulse Secure/Ivanti, Fortinet, GlobalProtect, Citrix NetScaler), OpenVPN, and WireGuard. Tests include: IKE aggressive mode (extracting the pre-shared key hash for offline cracking), SSL VPN path traversal vulnerabilities (CVE-2019-11510, CVE-2018-13379), default credentials, certificate validation issues, and split-tunnel configuration weaknesses.
4.3 YerraAD - Active Directory Penetration Testing (Priority 3)
YerraAD is a dedicated Active Directory penetration testing orchestrator. It performs domain enumeration, trust relationship mapping, Kerberos attacks, LDAP reconnaissance, attack path analysis, GPO abuse, delegation attacks, ACL abuse, and certificate services attacks.
Attack techniques
- AS-REP Roasting - Extract hashes for accounts with "Do not require Kerberos pre-authentication" for offline cracking.
- Kerberoasting - Extract service ticket hashes (TGS) for service accounts for offline cracking.
- Golden Ticket - Forge Kerberos TGTs using the KRBTGT account hash (requires domain admin).
- Silver Ticket - Forge service tickets for specific services using the service account hash.
- Constrained/Unconstrained Delegation Abuse - Exploit misconfigured delegation settings to impersonate privileged users.
- Resource-Based Constrained Delegation (RBCD) - Modify the
msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentityattribute to escalate privileges. - ACL Abuse - Exploit misconfigured access control entries (ForceChangePassword, GenericAll, WriteDacl, WriteOwner) for privilege escalation.
- AD Certificate Services (ESC1-ESC8) - Exploit vulnerable certificate templates, enrollment agent abuse, and NTLM relay to certificate services.
- BloodHound-Style Path Analysis - Build the complete AD relationship graph and identify the shortest path to Domain Admin.
Example attack chain
- Enumerate domain users via LDAP (anonymous bind or with low-privilege credentials)
- Identify AS-REP roastable accounts, extract hashes, crack offline with YerraCrack
- Use cracked credential for Kerberoasting, extract service ticket hashes
- Crack service account hash revealing SQL Server service account password
- Connect to SQL Server, execute
xp_cmdshell, extract additional credentials - Find domain admin hash in extracted credentials, pass-the-hash to domain controller
- Full domain compromise documented with complete evidence chain
4.4 YerraNetworkOrch - Network Scan Orchestrator (Priority 4)
The Network Scan Orchestrator coordinates all network scanning engines into a unified workflow: fast port discovery feeds into detailed service enumeration, which feeds into service-specific vulnerability testing. The orchestrator manages scan state, deduplicates findings across engines, builds the network topology map, and ensures that each discovered service is tested by the most appropriate engine. It integrates YerraConnect (banner grabbing), YerraProbe (host alive), YerraRecon (service detection), and all exploitation engines.
4.5 YerraConnect - Network Communication Toolkit (Priority 5)
YerraConnect is a pure-Python network communication toolkit supporting TCP and SSL/TLS connections for banner grabbing, service verification, and custom protocol interaction. It performs asynchronous connect-scan probes across multiple targets simultaneously, capturing service banners and TLS certificate information. Capabilities include: TCP and TLS banner grabbing with configurable timeout, custom protocol probes (HTTP, SMTP, FTP, POP3, IMAP, MySQL, PostgreSQL, Redis, MongoDB), SSL/TLS certificate extraction and analysis, and raw socket communication for custom protocol testing.
4.6 YerraProbe - Host Alive & Latency Prober (Priority 6)
YerraProbe is a pure-Python host discovery engine that performs ICMP echo, TCP SYN, and TCP connect probes to determine host availability and measure network latency. It supports multiple probe types to bypass firewall restrictions, if ICMP is blocked, TCP probes on common ports (80, 443, 22, 3389) confirm host availability. Probes run in parallel across large networks. Output includes latency statistics (min/avg/max/jitter) per host and a host-alive determination for each target.
4.7 YerraPortProbe: SYN Port Scanner (Priority 7)
YerraPortProbe performs high-performance SYN scanning using raw packet manipulation. It is faster than full TCP connect scans because it sends SYN packets and interprets RST/SYN-ACK responses without completing the TCP handshake. The engine supports host exclusion, port exclusion, CIDR input, and outputs results in JSON for downstream processing by other engines.
4.8 YerraFastScan - Ultra-Fast Port Scanner (Priority 8)
YerraFastScan is an ultra-high-speed port scanner designed for rapid initial reconnaissance. It scans all 65,535 ports in seconds by using asynchronous socket connections with configurable batch size (default: 4,500 simultaneous connections). Open ports discovered by YerraFastScan are automatically passed to YerraRecon for detailed service enumeration and vulnerability assessment.
4.9 YerraRecon - Network Scanner (Priority 9)
YerraRecon is PhantomYerra's full network scanning engine performing host discovery, port scanning (TCP/UDP), service version detection, OS fingerprinting, and vulnerability detection scripts.
Scan phases
- Host Discovery - Determines which hosts in the target range are alive using ICMP echo, TCP SYN to ports 80/443, TCP ACK, and ARP probes (for local networks).
- Port Scanning - Scans the target port range. Default scans cover the top 1,000 ports; aggressive mode scans all 65,535 TCP ports plus the top 1,000 UDP ports.
- Service Detection - Probes open ports to identify the running service and version using banner grabbing, protocol-specific probes, and SSL/TLS certificate inspection.
- OS Fingerprinting - Analyzes TCP/IP stack behavior (initial TTL, window size, TCP options) to identify the target operating system and version.
- Vulnerability Scripts - Runs vulnerability detection scripts against identified services: SMB vulnerabilities (EternalBlue/MS17-010), SSL/TLS issues, default credentials, known CVEs for detected service versions.
Example findings
| Finding | Severity | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| SMB signing not required (MS17-010 vulnerable) | CRITICAL | NSE script output confirming EternalBlue vulnerability |
| Anonymous FTP login allowed | HIGH | Successful login with empty credentials, directory listing retrieved |
| SSH weak algorithms (arcfour, des-cbc) | MEDIUM | Full cipher/MAC/KEX algorithm list from handshake |
| SNMP public community string | HIGH | System info, interface list, routing table extracted via SNMP walk |
4.10 YerraExploit - Windows/AD Attack Toolkit
YerraExploit provides deep Windows and Active Directory attack capabilities: credential harvesting (secretsdump for SAM/LSA/NTDS.dit), remote command execution (psexec, smbexec, wmiexec, dcomexec), Kerberos attacks (GetUserSPNs, GetNPUsers), NTLM relay (ntlmrelayx), MSSQL interaction (xp_cmdshell), and enumeration (rpcdump, lookupsid, samrdump). The AI orchestrator chains these attacks with findings from other engines automatically.
4.11 YerraEnum: SMB/NetBIOS Enumerator
YerraEnum performs full SMB and NetBIOS enumeration: user listing, group enumeration, share listing with permissions, password policy extraction, OS information, RID cycling for user discovery, and printer enumeration. Works against both Windows and Samba targets with null sessions (unauthenticated) or provided credentials.
4.12 YerraNetOps - Network Execution Framework
YerraNetOps is a multi-protocol execution framework supporting SMB, WinRM, MSSQL, LDAP, SSH, FTP, and RDP. It enables credential validation across multiple hosts simultaneously ("credential spraying"), share enumeration, command execution, and module-based post-exploitation. The spray technique tests a small number of passwords against all discovered user accounts to find weak credentials without triggering account lockouts.
4.13 YerraFramework - Exploitation Framework
YerraFramework provides access to thousands of exploits, payloads, and post-exploitation modules. The AI orchestrator selects and configures the appropriate exploit based on the target service version and vulnerability detected by YerraRecon. Capabilities include: exploit selection and automatic configuration, payload generation (Meterpreter, reverse shell, bind shell) tailored to target OS and architecture, post-exploitation modules (privilege escalation, credential harvesting, pivoting, persistence), auxiliary modules (service scanning, brute forcing, protocol fuzzing), and evasion modules (antivirus bypass, payload encoding, obfuscation).
4.14 YerraRouterExploit - Router/IoT Exploitation
YerraRouterExploit targets routers, access points, and network devices with exploit modules for Cisco, MikroTik, D-Link, Netgear, TP-Link, Huawei, ZyXEL, and others. Includes default credential testing and firmware vulnerability detection for infrastructure assessments.
5. Reconnaissance & OSINT
Reconnaissance is the foundation of every engagement. PhantomYerra's reconnaissance suite discovers subdomains, maps DNS infrastructure, finds related assets, archives historical URLs, identifies technology stacks, and gathers organizational intelligence: all feeding into the AI orchestrator's attack planning. The recon surface contains 10 registered adapters that work together through the URL Discovery Orchestrator and Asset Discovery engine.
5.1 YerraOSINT - Asset Discovery Engine (Priority 1)
YerraOSINT discovers subdomains and associated assets using passive data sources: certificate transparency logs (crt.sh, Certspotter, Facebook CT), DNS datasets (DNSdumpster, RapidDNS, HackerTarget), search engines (Google, Bing, DuckDuckGo dorking), web archives (Wayback Machine, CommonCrawl, AlienVault OTX), and threat intelligence feeds (VirusTotal, SecurityTrails, Shodan, Censys, BinaryEdge). It queries over 40 sources simultaneously without sending any traffic to the target, making it completely passive and undetectable. Output: a deduplicated list of discovered subdomains with DNS resolution status, IP addresses, CNAME records, and live/dead status.
5.2 YerraURLDiscovery: URL Discovery Orchestrator (Priority 2)
Coordinates multiple URL discovery engines (YerraArchive, YerraWayback, YerraSpider, YerraAssetFinder, YerraHTTPProbe, YerraDeepRecon) into a unified pipeline. Discovered URLs are deduplicated, normalized, and categorized by type (page, API endpoint, file, resource). The orchestrator manages rate limiting across engines and feeds results to the web scanning surface.
Sub-engines within URL Discovery
- GauAdapter (YerraArchive) - Retrieves historical URLs from the Wayback Machine, Common Crawl, AlienVault OTX, and URLScan.io. Discovers endpoints, parameters, and pages that no longer appear in the current application but may still be accessible.
- WaybackUrlsAdapter (YerraWayback) - Specifically queries the Wayback Machine CDX API for all archived URLs dating back years.
- GospiderAdapter (YerraSpider) - Passive web spider that extracts linked URLs, JavaScript file references, form actions, robots.txt entries, and sitemap.xml URLs.
- AssetfinderAdapter (YerraAssetFinder) - Discovers related domains and subdomains from certificate transparency logs and DNS records.
- HttpprobeAdapter (YerraHTTPProbe) - Probes domains for live HTTP/HTTPS services on ports 80, 443, 8080, 8443. Returns confirmed live web hosts with status codes and response titles.
- AmassAdapter (YerraDeepRecon) - Performs the most thorough subdomain enumeration: DNS brute-forcing, web scraping, certificate transparency, API sources, and graph-based DNS relationship mapping.
5.3 YerraDNS: DNS Brute-Force & Resolution (Priority 3)
Active DNS brute-forcing to discover subdomains not found in passive sources. Uses high-performance DNS resolution with wildcard detection and filtering. Methodology: (1) load wordlist (100K default, 1M+ aggressive), (2) detect wildcard DNS by resolving random non-existent subdomains, (3) resolve all entries, (4) filter wildcard matches, (5) output confirmed subdomains with resolved IPs.
5.4 YerraASN: ASN Mapping & IP Range Discovery (Priority 4)
Maps an organization's complete IP space by querying ASN databases. Given a domain or organization name, identifies all associated ASNs and their IP ranges, revealing cloud infrastructure, colocation facilities, and regional offices that may not be linked to the primary domain.
5.5 YerraMetaSearch: OSINT Aggregator (Priority 5)
Aggregates OSINT data from ASN lookups, IP-to-organization mapping, CIDR range discovery, related domain identification, and technology fingerprinting. Acts as a meta-search engine querying public databases to build a full profile of the target's internet presence.
5.6 YerraGitExpose - Exposed Git Repository Finder (Priority 6)
Detects exposed .git directories on web servers and extracts their contents. When a web server inadvertently serves the .git directory, the entire source code history (including credentials and API keys in past commits) can be reconstructed. Scans commit history for secrets and reports all sensitive data found.
5.7 YerraCIDR - Network Range Processor (Priority 7)
Processes CIDR ranges into individual IP addresses, aggregates overlapping ranges, converts between CIDR and IP list formats, and filters IP ranges. Used internally by other engines to normalize target specifications and prepare IP lists for scanning.
5.8 YerraChaosClient - Bug Bounty Recon Feed (Priority 8)
Retrieves subdomain data from the ProjectDiscovery Chaos dataset, a continuously updated repository of subdomains for bug bounty programs. When the target domain exists in the Chaos database, the engine retrieves all known subdomains instantly without any active scanning.
5.9 YerraTakeover - Subdomain Takeover Detection (Priority 9)
Identifies subdomains vulnerable to takeover. When a subdomain points to a decommissioned cloud service (S3, Heroku, GitHub Pages, Azure, Shopify, etc.) but the DNS record remains, an attacker can claim that resource. Impact: phishing on legitimate subdomain, cookie theft via parent domain, brand abuse, SPF bypass for email spoofing.
5.10 YerraCrawl - Advanced Web Crawler (Priority 10)
Advanced crawler supporting both standard and JavaScript-rendered crawling via headless browser. Discovers endpoints in SPAs, AJAX interfaces, and modern JavaScript frameworks that traditional crawlers miss. Extracts URLs from JavaScript source, API calls, WebSocket connections, and dynamic content.
5.11 Additional Reconnaissance Engines
The following engines operate within the URL Discovery and Asset Discovery orchestrators:
- AlterdxAdapter (YerraPermute) - Generates subdomain permutations from discovered subdomains (e.g.,
dev.example.comgeneratesdev-api,dev2,staging-devand hundreds more). - UnCoverAdapter (YerraExposure) - Queries internet-wide scanning databases (Shodan, Censys, Fofa, Hunter, Zoomeye) for exposed services.
- CdnCheckAdapter (YerraCDNDetect) - Identifies CDN/WAF presence (Cloudflare, Akamai, AWS CloudFront, Fastly, 30+ others) to guide payload selection.
- SpiderFootAdapter (YerraIntelPlatform): OSINT automation correlating 200+ data sources with recursive entity discovery.
- TheHarvesterAdapter (YerraHarvest) - Discovers email addresses, employee names, subdomains from search engines and PGP key servers.
- EyeWitnessAdapter (YerraEyeWitness) - Captures and categorizes web service screenshots for visual reconnaissance.
6. Static Application Security Testing (SAST)
Static Application Security Testing analyzes source code without executing it to identify security vulnerabilities, code quality issues, and insecure coding patterns. PhantomYerra's SAST suite supports 15+ programming languages with both rule-based detection and AI-assisted analysis through the YerraSAST engine and its language-specific adapters.
6.1 YerraSAST - Universal Static Analyzer (Priority 1)
YerraSAST is the primary SAST engine supporting Python, JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Go, Ruby, PHP, C#/.NET, Kotlin, Swift, Scala, Rust, C/C++, and COBOL. It uses pattern-based rules with dataflow analysis to detect: injection flaws (SQL, command, XSS, LDAP, XPath), authentication issues (hardcoded credentials, weak hashing), cryptographic weaknesses (weak algorithms, hardcoded keys, insecure RNG), insecure deserialization, path traversal, SSRF, race conditions, and information exposure.
Language-specific adapters
| Language | Adapter | Framework Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| Python | PythonSASTAdapter | Django, Flask, FastAPI, SQLAlchemy |
| Java | JavaSASTAdapter | Spring, Struts, Hibernate, J2EE |
| Go | GoSASTAdapter + GosecAdapter | net/http, gin, echo, gorm |
| JavaScript/TypeScript | JavaScriptSASTAdapter | Express, React, Angular, Node.js |
| C#/.NET | DotNetSASTAdapter | ASP.NET, Entity Framework, MVC |
| PHP | PhpSASTAdapter | Laravel, Symfony, WordPress, Drupal |
| Ruby | RubySASTAdapter | Rails, Sinatra, ActiveRecord |
| Kotlin | KotlinSASTAdapter | Spring Boot, Ktor, Android |
| Swift | SwiftSASTAdapter | iOS, macOS, Vapor |
| Scala | ScalaSASTAdapter | Play Framework, Akka, Spark |
| Rust | RustSASTAdapter | Actix, Rocket, Tokio unsafe blocks |
| C/C++ | CppSASTAdapter | Buffer overflows, format strings, use-after-free, double-free |
| COBOL | CobolSASTAdapter | Mainframe security, embedded SQL injection |
6.2 YerraGoSec - Go Security Analyzer (Priority 2)
Deep security analysis for Go codebases: unsafe pointer usage, SQL injection in database/sql, command injection in os/exec, insecure TLS configurations, weak cryptographic usage, file permission issues. Integrates with Go's AST parser for accurate analysis.
6.3 YerraCodeQL - Semantic Code Analysis
Semantic analysis using database queries over the code's AST, control flow graph, and data flow graph. Detects complex patterns: multi-step taint tracking, interprocedural analysis across multiple files, and context-sensitive detection where the same pattern is vulnerable in one context but safe in another.
6.4 YerraIaCAnalyze - IaC Static Scanner
Scans Infrastructure as Code (Terraform, CloudFormation, Ansible, Kubernetes YAML, Helm charts, Dockerfiles) for security misconfigurations within the SAST pipeline.
7. Software Composition Analysis (SCA)
Software Composition Analysis identifies vulnerabilities in third-party and open-source dependencies used by the target application. Modern applications derive 70-90% of their code from third-party libraries, making SCA a critical attack surface. PhantomYerra's SCA pipeline generates a complete Software Bill of Materials, cross-references every component against multiple vulnerability databases, and performs reachability analysis to determine whether a vulnerable function is actually called in the application's code paths.
7.1 YerraSCA: SBOM Generator
Generates a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) in CycloneDX and SPDX formats. Identifies all dependencies - direct, transitive, and vendored - across npm, pip, Maven, Gradle, Go modules, Cargo, NuGet, RubyGems, Composer, and CocoaPods.
What information is needed
- Path to the application source code, container image, or binary
- Package manifest files (package.json, requirements.txt, pom.xml, go.sum, Cargo.lock, etc.) are auto-detected
- Container registry credentials for private image scanning (optional)
How the test works step-by-step
- Manifest Discovery - Recursively scans the project tree for all package managers and their lock files, including nested monorepo structures.
- Dependency Resolution - Resolves the full dependency graph including transitive dependencies (dependencies of dependencies) to arbitrary depth. Vendored copies (node_modules, vendor/) are also cataloged.
- Version Pinning - Extracts exact installed versions (not semver ranges) from lock files, ensuring accuracy in vulnerability matching.
- SBOM Generation - Outputs CycloneDX 1.5 and SPDX 2.3 formatted SBOMs with component metadata: name, version, license, supplier, package URL (purl), and SHA-256 hash.
- License Analysis - Identifies component licenses (MIT, Apache-2.0, GPL, AGPL, proprietary) and flags license conflicts that may create legal risk.
7.2 YerraVulnScan - Dependency Vulnerability Scanner
Scans the SBOM against NVD, GitHub Advisory, OSV.dev, and vendor-specific databases. Reports CVE ID, CVSS score, affected/fixed versions, and reachability analysis indicating whether the vulnerable function is actually called. Unreachable vulnerable code is downgraded to Informational.
How vulnerability matching works
- Each component's package URL (purl) is matched against known vulnerability records in NVD, GitHub Security Advisories, OSV.dev, and vendor databases.
- Version comparison uses semantic versioning and version-range matching to determine if the installed version falls within the affected range.
- Reachability analysis traces call graphs from the application's entry points to determine whether the vulnerable function in the dependency is actually invoked. Unreachable vulnerabilities are downgraded.
- Fix availability is checked: if a patched version exists, the finding includes the minimum fixed version and upgrade instructions.
Example findings
| Component | CVE | CVSS | Reachable | Fix Version |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| log4j-core 2.14.1 | CVE-2021-44228 | 10.0 | Yes: JNDI lookup called | 2.17.1+ |
| lodash 4.17.20 | CVE-2021-23337 | 7.2 | No - template() not used | 4.17.21+ |
| openssl 1.1.1k | CVE-2022-0778 | 7.5 | Yes - certificate parsing | 1.1.1n+ |
| requests 2.25.1 | CVE-2023-32681 | 6.1 | Yes - proxy auth used | 2.31.0+ |
Confirming exploitation
When a reachable vulnerability is identified, the AI orchestrator attempts exploitation: for log4j, a JNDI lookup payload is injected; for deserialization flaws, a gadget chain is constructed; for path traversal in dependencies, traversal payloads target the vulnerable code path. Confirmed exploitation elevates the finding and includes full evidence (request, response, extracted data).
8. Infrastructure as Code Security
Infrastructure as Code (IaC) security testing analyzes the declarative configuration files that define cloud and container infrastructure. Misconfigurations in IaC templates are the leading cause of cloud security incidents. A single overly permissive security group rule, an unencrypted S3 bucket, or a privileged container can expose an entire environment. PhantomYerra scans IaC templates before deployment, catching misconfigurations at the code review stage rather than after they are live in production.
8.1 YerraTFSec - Terraform Security Scanner (Priority 1)
Deep static analysis of Terraform code including module resolution, variable interpolation, and cross-resource relationship analysis. Identifies issues requiring understanding of resource relationships (e.g., a load balancer terminating TLS but forwarding unencrypted traffic to backends, or an IAM policy granting * permissions on sensitive resources).
What information is needed
- Path to Terraform root module directory (auto-detects
*.tfand*.tf.jsonfiles) - Optional: variable values file (
terraform.tfvars) for accurate variable interpolation - Optional: cloud provider context (AWS, Azure, GCP) for provider-specific rule sets
How the test works step-by-step
- Module Resolution - Resolves module references (local, registry, Git) and builds the complete resource graph.
- Variable Interpolation - Substitutes variable values to analyze actual configurations (e.g., a
cidr_blockvariable set to0.0.0.0/0exposes a security group to the internet). - Cross-Resource Analysis - Traces relationships between resources: security groups attached to instances, IAM policies attached to roles, encryption keys referenced by storage buckets.
- Rule Evaluation - Evaluates 350+ rules covering CIS Benchmarks (AWS, Azure, GCP), encryption at rest and in transit, network exposure, IAM least privilege, logging and monitoring, and data protection.
- Severity Assignment - Each finding receives a severity based on the potential exposure: an S3 bucket with public ACL is Critical; a missing access log is Low.
Example findings
| Finding | Resource | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| Security group allows ingress from 0.0.0.0/0 to port 22 (SSH) | aws_security_group.web_sg | CRITICAL |
| S3 bucket encryption not enabled | aws_s3_bucket.data_lake | HIGH |
| RDS instance publicly accessible | aws_db_instance.main | CRITICAL |
| IAM policy allows sts:AssumeRole with wildcard principal | aws_iam_policy.cross_account | HIGH |
| CloudTrail logging disabled | aws_cloudtrail.audit | MEDIUM |
8.2 YerraIaCGuard - Multi-IaC Scanner (Priority 2)
Scans Terraform, CloudFormation, Azure ARM, Kubernetes manifests, Helm charts, and Dockerfiles against 500+ policies covering CIS benchmarks, AWS/Azure/GCP best practices, and regulatory compliance (PCI-DSS, HIPAA, SOC2). Unlike YerraTFSec which focuses on Terraform depth, YerraIaCGuard provides breadth across all IaC formats.
Supported IaC formats
| Format | File Types | Policy Count |
|---|---|---|
| Terraform | *.tf, *.tf.json | 200+ |
| CloudFormation | *.yaml, *.json (CFN) | 100+ |
| Kubernetes | *.yaml (K8s manifests) | 80+ |
| Helm | Helm chart directories | 50+ |
| Dockerfiles | Dockerfile* | 40+ |
| Azure ARM | *.json (ARM templates) | 60+ |
Compliance mapping
Each finding maps to one or more compliance frameworks (PCI-DSS 4.0, HIPAA, SOC2, CIS Benchmarks, NIST 800-53), enabling teams to demonstrate compliance coverage during audit. The compliance report groups findings by framework and control ID.
9. Cloud Security Posture
Cloud security posture management assesses running cloud environments for misconfigurations, excessive permissions, exposed resources, and compliance violations. While IaC scanning catches issues before deployment, cloud posture scanning catches drift (manual changes after deployment), resources created outside IaC, and runtime-specific issues like public snapshots or unused security groups with overly permissive rules. PhantomYerra integrates with AWS, Azure, and GCP APIs to perform read-only assessment of the live cloud environment.
9.1 YerraCloudScan - Multi-Cloud Scanner (Priority 1)
Multi-purpose security scanning: container images in ECR/ACR/GCR for CVEs, secret exposure, and misconfigured permissions. Also scans filesystem paths, Git repositories, and Kubernetes clusters. Outputs SARIF for CI/CD integration.
What information is needed
- Cloud provider credentials with read-only access (AWS IAM role, Azure service principal, GCP service account)
- Container image references (registry/repository:tag) for container scanning
- Kubernetes kubeconfig for cluster assessment
- Scope definition: which accounts, regions, and resource types to assess
How the test works step-by-step
- Authentication - Connects to the cloud provider API using provided credentials with least-privilege read-only access.
- Resource Enumeration - Discovers all resources across specified regions: compute instances, storage buckets, databases, load balancers, IAM entities, networking components.
- Configuration Assessment - Each resource's configuration is evaluated against security rules: is encryption enabled? Are access policies restrictive? Is logging active? Are security groups least-privilege?
- Container Image Scanning - Pulls and layers container images to identify OS packages, language dependencies, and embedded secrets. Each component is checked against NVD, vendor advisories, and the CISA KEV catalog.
- Kubernetes Assessment - Evaluates cluster configuration: RBAC policies, network policies, pod security standards, secrets management, admission controllers, and runtime security.
Example findings
| Finding | Resource | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| S3 bucket allows public read via ACL | s3://customer-data-prod | CRITICAL |
| EC2 instance has IMDSv1 enabled (SSRF exploitable) | i-0abc123def456 | HIGH |
| Container image runs as root | registry/app:latest | MEDIUM |
| Kubernetes dashboard exposed without auth | kubernetes-dashboard:443 | CRITICAL |
9.2 YerraCloudPosture - Cloud Network Analyzer (Priority 2)
Analyzes VPC/VNet configurations, security groups, NACLs, route tables, peering connections across AWS, Azure, and GCP. Identifies overly permissive rules, unused security groups, publicly accessible resources, and network segmentation issues. Builds a topology diagram showing lateral movement opportunities from any compromised resource to other reachable resources.
Lateral movement analysis
The cloud network analyzer maps reachability between all resources: which instances can communicate with the database tier? Can a compromised web server reach the management plane? Are there cross-VPC paths through peering or transit gateways? The resulting topology graph is included in the report and feeds into the overall attack graph, connecting cloud misconfigurations to potential exploitation paths.
10. Dynamic Application Security Testing (DAST)
Dynamic Application Security Testing probes running applications by sending crafted HTTP requests and analyzing responses. Unlike SAST which reads code, DAST tests the actual deployed application with its real runtime behavior, middleware, and configuration. PhantomYerra's DAST suite provides full coverage of the OWASP Top 10 through automated crawling, intelligent payload injection, authentication handling, and out-of-band detection for blind vulnerabilities that produce no visible in-band response.
10.1 YerraDASTOrch: DAST Orchestrator (Priority 1)
Coordinates all dynamic testing engines. Manages authentication state, session cookies, CSRF tokens. Covers OWASP Top 10 comprehensively through active crawling, payload injection, authentication testing, and API mode (OpenAPI/Swagger). Implements intelligent deduplication across engines.
What information is needed
- Target application URL
- Authentication credentials (username/password, bearer token, or recorded login sequence)
- API specification (OpenAPI/Swagger, GraphQL schema, or WSDL) for API mode
- Environment type: test/staging (full exploitation) or production (safe checks only)
- Exclusion patterns: URLs or parameters that should not be modified (logout, delete, payment)
How the test works step-by-step
- Authenticated Crawling - Logs into the application using provided credentials, then crawls all accessible pages while maintaining session state. JavaScript rendering discovers SPA routes.
- Attack Surface Mapping - Identifies all input vectors: URL parameters, form fields, JSON/XML bodies, HTTP headers, cookies, file upload fields, and WebSocket messages.
- Payload Injection - For each input vector, injects category-specific payloads: SQL injection, XSS, command injection, path traversal, SSRF, XXE, SSTI, CRLF injection, open redirect. Each payload set includes WAF-bypass variants.
- Response Analysis - Compares injected responses against baselines looking for: error messages (SQL errors, stack traces), reflected payloads in unsafe contexts, response timing differences (blind injection), new headers or status codes.
- API Mode - Parses the API specification and tests every endpoint with every parameter type. Tests include: parameter type confusion, boundary values, missing required fields, extra fields (mass assignment), authentication bypass via parameter manipulation.
- Deduplication - Consolidates identical vulnerabilities found across multiple endpoints into single findings with all affected URLs listed.
Example findings
| Finding | Endpoint | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| SQL Injection in search parameter | GET /api/products?search= | CRITICAL |
| Reflected XSS in error message | GET /login?error= | HIGH |
| CSRF on password change (no token) | POST /account/password | HIGH |
| Missing Content-Security-Policy header | All endpoints | LOW |
10.2 YerraOOB - Out-of-Band Testing Engine (Priority 2)
Detects vulnerabilities with no in-band response: blind SSRF, blind XSS, blind XXE, blind RCE, DNS rebinding, email header injection. Generates unique callback URLs per test case, injects them into payloads, and monitors for interactions. Each interaction is correlated with the originating test and captured as evidence (source IP, request method, headers, body, timing).
How out-of-band detection works
- Callback URL Generation - For each injection point, a unique callback URL is generated containing a correlation ID (e.g.,
xyz123.oob.phantomyerra.local). This URL is embedded in payloads for each vulnerability class. - Payload Injection - Payloads are injected that would cause the server to make an outbound connection:
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://xyz123.oob...">for XXE,curl http://xyz123.oob...for RCE, URL parameters with the callback for SSRF. - Interaction Monitoring - The OOB server monitors for DNS lookups, HTTP/HTTPS requests, and SMTP connections to any generated callback URL. Each interaction is logged with timestamp, source IP, protocol, and full request details.
- Correlation - When an interaction is received, the correlation ID maps it back to the specific injection point and payload type, confirming the vulnerability class and producing a confirmed finding with evidence.
OOB vulnerability classes
| Class | Detection Mechanism | Typical Impact |
|---|---|---|
| Blind SSRF | HTTP callback from target server | HIGH - Internal network scanning, cloud metadata access |
| Blind XXE | DNS/HTTP callback from XML parser | HIGH - File read via error-based or data exfiltration |
| Blind XSS | HTTP callback from admin browser | HIGH - Admin session hijacking |
| Blind RCE | DNS/HTTP callback from OS command | CRITICAL - Full server compromise |
| DNS Rebinding | DNS TTL manipulation + callback | HIGH - Internal service access from browser |
11. AI/LLM Security
AI and Large Language Model security is one of the fastest-growing attack surfaces in modern applications. PhantomYerra provides five dedicated engines covering the entire OWASP LLM Top 10 (2025 edition). These engines test LLM-powered chatbots, RAG pipelines, AI agents with tool access, and any application that integrates language model capabilities. The AI orchestrator understands the nuances of LLM-specific attacks and adapts payloads based on the model's observed behavior, systematically escalating from simple injection attempts to complex multi-turn jailbreak chains.
11.1 YerraPromptInject - Prompt Injection Tester
Tests LLM applications for prompt injection (OWASP LLM01): direct injection, indirect injection via external data sources, jailbreak techniques (DAN, roleplay, hypothetical framing, language switching, encoding tricks), system prompt extraction, and instruction hierarchy bypass. Generates thousands of variants per test.
What information is needed
- Target LLM application URL or API endpoint
- Authentication method (API key, OAuth, session cookie)
- Known system prompt context (optional; the engine attempts extraction regardless)
- Model identifier if known (helps select model-specific bypass techniques)
Injection categories tested
| Category | Technique | Payload Count |
|---|---|---|
| Direct Injection | Instruction override, role hijacking, delimiter escape | 500+ |
| Indirect Injection | Payloads in documents, URLs, emails processed by the LLM | 200+ |
| Jailbreaks | DAN, developer mode, hypothetical framing, roleplay scenarios | 300+ |
| System Prompt Extraction | "Repeat your instructions", encoding tricks, translation abuse | 150+ |
| Multi-turn Escalation | Gradual trust building across conversation turns | 100+ |
| Encoding Bypasses | Base64, ROT13, Unicode, leetspeak, pig latin encoded payloads | 200+ |
How to confirm exploitation
Injection is confirmed when the LLM produces output that violates its system instructions: executing unauthorized actions, revealing system prompts, generating restricted content, or accessing data outside its intended scope. Each confirmed injection includes the full conversation log as evidence.
11.2 YerraRAGProbe: RAG Pipeline Tester
Tests RAG pipelines for data poisoning, context manipulation, and information leakage (LLM03, LLM06). Verifies that document-grounded responses cannot be manipulated to return unauthorized data, that cross-user document isolation is enforced, and that adversarial documents cannot override system instructions through the retrieval context.
Test methodology
- Knowledge Base Injection - Uploads documents containing prompt injection payloads and verifies whether the LLM executes them when those documents are retrieved.
- Cross-User Leakage - Queries the RAG system with prompts designed to trigger retrieval of other users' private documents. Tests access control boundaries in the vector database.
- Retrieval Manipulation - Crafts queries that manipulate the similarity search to return unexpected documents, bypassing intended retrieval boundaries.
- Context Window Poisoning - Tests whether adversarial content in retrieved documents can override or conflict with system-level instructions.
11.3 YerraAgentHijack: AI Agent Security Tester
Tests AI agents for excessive agency (LLM08): tool abuse beyond intended scope, permission escalation through prompt manipulation, unvalidated tool outputs that enable injection chains, and multi-agent context isolation failures where one agent's context leaks to another.
Attack vectors tested
- Tool Scope Abuse - Prompts the agent to use tools in ways not intended (e.g., file system tool to read
/etc/passwd, email tool to send to unauthorized recipients) - Permission Escalation - Attempts to convince the agent it has higher privileges than granted, bypassing tool restrictions
- Output Injection - Tests whether tool outputs (which may contain attacker-controlled data) are processed unsafely by the agent
- Multi-Agent Isolation - In multi-agent systems, tests whether one agent's conversation can influence another's behavior
11.4 YerraLLMFuzz: LLM Fuzzer
Fuzz testing against LLM endpoints: malformed inputs, boundary cases, token limits, unicode edge cases, multi-turn context overflow, concurrent request handling, and safety filter bypass. Identifies edge cases that cause unexpected behavior including model crashes, infinite loops, and safety bypass conditions.
Fuzzing strategies
- Token Boundary - Sends inputs at exact token limits to test truncation handling
- Unicode Abuse - Right-to-left override characters, zero-width joiners, homoglyphs, combining characters
- Context Overflow - Multi-turn conversations that exceed the context window to test memory management
- Concurrent Requests - Parallel requests to test session isolation and race conditions in stateful LLM applications
- Format Confusion - Mixing JSON, XML, markdown, and code blocks in unexpected ways
11.5 YerraAISec - Full AI Security Suite
Full LLM vulnerability scanner covering all OWASP LLM Top 10 with structured test suites. Runs systematic test campaigns against each category with hundreds of test cases per category, providing a complete compliance scorecard.
OWASP LLM Top 10 coverage
| ID | Category | Test Approach |
|---|---|---|
| LLM01 | Prompt Injection | Direct, indirect, and multi-turn injection campaigns |
| LLM02 | Insecure Output Handling | XSS/SQLi in LLM output consumed by downstream systems |
| LLM03 | Training Data Poisoning | Adversarial inputs that reveal training data patterns |
| LLM04 | Model DoS | Resource exhaustion through complex prompts, recursive generation |
| LLM05 | Supply Chain | Model provenance verification, poisoned fine-tune detection |
| LLM06 | Sensitive Info Disclosure | Training data extraction, PII leakage, memorization probes |
| LLM07 | Insecure Plugin Design | Plugin input validation, privilege escalation through plugins |
| LLM08 | Excessive Agency | Unauthorized tool use, permission boundaries, action validation |
| LLM09 | Overreliance | Hallucination measurement, citation accuracy, factual grounding |
| LLM10 | Model Theft | Model extraction through systematic querying, distillation detection |
12. OT/ICS/SCADA Security
OT/ICS systems control physical processes including manufacturing equipment, power grid components, water treatment facilities, and building automation. PhantomYerra enforces mandatory safety policy: OT/ICS engines will NOT execute without explicit authorization and environment confirmation. All tests are non-destructive by default. Write operations (register writes, firmware updates, configuration changes) require a separate explicit confirmation even when destructive testing is authorized.
OT/ICS/SCADA security testing assesses industrial control systems for vulnerabilities in their communication protocols, device configurations, network architecture, and IT/OT convergence points. These systems were historically designed for isolated networks without security; their increasing connectivity to IT networks and the internet has created critical attack surfaces. A compromised PLC can cause physical damage, safety hazards, and operational disruption.
12.1 YerraOTProtocol: OT Protocol Scanner (Priority 1)
Coordinates scanning across Modbus TCP/RTU, S7Comm, EtherNet/IP, DNP3, OPC UA, BACnet, PROFINET, and HART. Safety-first approach: passive protocol identification, then read-only queries, with active probing only if explicitly authorized.
What information is needed
- Target IP range or specific device addresses
- Protocol identification (if known; otherwise, auto-detection is used)
- Safety authorization level: passive only, read-only active, or full active (write operations)
- Network topology documentation (optional; helps identify IT/OT boundary points)
How the test works step-by-step
- Protocol Fingerprinting - Passively monitors network traffic to identify which industrial protocols are in use, without sending any packets.
- Device Discovery - Sends protocol-specific discovery packets (Modbus device identification, S7Comm CPU identification, OPC UA discovery) to enumerate all reachable devices.
- Read-Only Assessment - Queries device configuration, firmware version, CPU state, module inventory, and running programs using read-only protocol operations.
- Authentication Testing - Tests whether devices accept unauthenticated connections for read and write operations. Most legacy protocols (Modbus, S7Comm) lack authentication entirely.
- Network Segmentation Verification - Tests whether IT/OT boundaries are properly enforced: can an IT network host reach OT devices? Are engineering workstations properly segmented?
Example findings
| Finding | Protocol | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| Modbus device accepts unauthenticated write to coil registers | Modbus TCP | CRITICAL |
| S7Comm PLC firmware version has known RCE vulnerability | S7Comm | CRITICAL |
| OPC UA server accepts anonymous connections with write access | OPC UA | HIGH |
| No network segmentation between IT and OT VLANs | Network | HIGH |
| BACnet device exposes building automation control | BACnet | MEDIUM |
12.2 YerraModbus - Modbus Protocol Tester (Priority 2)
Tests Modbus implementations: device identification (Function Code 43/14), register enumeration (holding, input, coils, discrete), unauthenticated write testing, function code fuzzing, broadcast response testing. Modbus, designed in 1979, lacks built-in authentication, encryption, or integrity checking - any device with network access to a Modbus endpoint can read and write all registers, potentially controlling physical equipment.
Register enumeration methodology
The engine systematically reads all register ranges: holding registers (40001-49999), input registers (30001-39999), coils (00001-09999), and discrete inputs (10001-19999). Register values are analyzed for patterns: temperature sensors, pressure readings, motor speeds, valve positions, setpoints, and alarm thresholds. Undocumented registers are flagged for manual review.
12.3 YerraOTScan: OT Scan Orchestrator (Priority 3)
Full OT assessment: PLC identification (Siemens S7, Allen-Bradley, Schneider, Mitsubishi), CPU type/firmware extraction, default password testing, network topology mapping, IT/OT convergence analysis, HMI web interface testing. Compliance mapping to IEC 62443, NERC CIP, and NIST 800-82 standards.
IEC 62443 compliance mapping
Every OT finding maps to the applicable IEC 62443 security level requirement, enabling organizations to assess their current security level (SL-1 through SL-4) and identify gaps required to reach their target security level. Findings also map to NERC CIP requirements for power grid operators and NIST 800-82 for general ICS environments.
13. IoT & Embedded Device Security
IoT and embedded device security testing covers the unique attack surfaces presented by connected devices: consumer IoT (cameras, smart home), enterprise IoT (printers, building controls), industrial IoT (sensors, gateways), and embedded systems with custom firmware. These devices often run minimal operating systems with limited security features, use lightweight protocols (MQTT, CoAP, BLE, Zigbee), and may lack update mechanisms. PhantomYerra assesses both the network-facing services and the device internals through firmware extraction, hardware interface testing, and wireless protocol analysis.
13.1 YerraIoTOrch - IoT Orchestrator (Priority 1-2)
Coordinates all IoT scanners including firmware analysis, network scanning, and wireless protocol testing. Maps the complete IoT deployment: devices, protocols, cloud connections, and data flows. Identifies default credentials, unencrypted communications, outdated firmware, and exposed management interfaces.
What information is needed
- Target device IP addresses or network range
- Firmware images (if available for offline analysis)
- Device documentation (optional; helps identify expected services and protocols)
- Wireless adapter presence (required for BLE and Zigbee testing)
How the test works step-by-step
- Device Discovery - Scans the network for IoT devices using protocol-specific probes (mDNS, SSDP/UPnP, SNMP, Bonjour, ARP) and fingerprints device types.
- Service Enumeration - Maps exposed services: web interfaces, SSH/Telnet, MQTT, CoAP, custom TCP/UDP services. Each service is tested for default credentials and known vulnerabilities.
- Firmware Analysis - Extracts and analyzes firmware for hardcoded credentials, backdoors, outdated libraries, and insecure configurations (see Section 15).
- Communication Analysis - Captures and analyzes device-to-cloud and device-to-device traffic for unencrypted data transmission, authentication weaknesses, and data leakage.
- Update Mechanism Testing - Tests OTA (over-the-air) update mechanisms for: unsigned firmware acceptance, rollback attacks, downgrade attacks, and man-in-the-middle update interception.
13.2 YerraBinaryDiff - Binary Differential Engine (Priority 4)
Compares firmware versions (pre-patch vs post-patch) to identify exactly which functions were modified, what vulnerability was fixed, and how to craft exploits for unpatched devices. Uses function-level hashing and control flow graph comparison to isolate security-relevant changes from unrelated code updates.
13.3 YerraUART: UART/Serial Interface Tester (Priority 5)
Tests UART serial interfaces: auto-detects baud rate (common: 9600, 19200, 38400, 57600, 115200), connects to serial console, identifies the environment (Linux shell, U-Boot bootloader, custom firmware CLI), and tests for authentication bypass. Many embedded devices expose an unauthenticated root shell via UART, providing complete device control.
Exploitation methodology
Once a UART console is accessed: (1) identify the operating system, (2) extract filesystem contents (/etc/shadow, configuration files, SSL keys), (3) dump flash memory, (4) modify boot parameters to gain root access, (5) establish persistent backdoor for remote access testing.
13.4 YerraJTAG: JTAG Debug Interface Tester (Priority 6)
Tests JTAG debug interfaces: identifies active pins on test points, detects TAP controller state machine, reads device ID registers (IDCODE), and extracts firmware from flash memory. An exposed JTAG port provides full processor control including reading/writing memory, single-stepping execution, setting breakpoints, and complete firmware extraction even when readout protection is not enabled.
13.5 YerraCoAP - CoAP Protocol Tester
Tests CoAP (Constrained Application Protocol) implementations: resource discovery via /.well-known/core, access control testing on each resource, DTLS implementation verification for transport security, observe notification subscription without authorization, and message fuzzing for buffer overflows and parsing vulnerabilities in the lightweight protocol stack.
13.6 YerraMQTT: MQTT Broker Tester
Tests MQTT brokers comprehensively: anonymous access, wildcard topic subscription (#), message injection to control topics, TLS configuration verification, ACL bypass attempts, retained message exploitation, and DoS resilience testing.
Common IoT attack chain via MQTT
- Connect to MQTT broker anonymously (no authentication required).
- Subscribe to
#(all topics) to observe all device communications. - Identify control topics (e.g.,
home/thermostat/set,factory/valve/control). - Publish commands to control topics to manipulate physical devices.
- Capture credentials and tokens transmitted in MQTT messages.
13.7 YerraBLE & YerraZigbee - Wireless IoT Scanners
BLE (Bluetooth Low Energy): Discovers BLE devices, enumerates services and characteristics (GATT profile), tests pairing mechanisms (Just Works, Passkey, Numeric Comparison), checks for unencrypted characteristics that expose sensitive data, and tests for BLE relay attacks. Zigbee: Captures Zigbee packets, decrypts traffic using known trust center keys (many devices use the well-known ZigbeeAlliance09 key), identifies all network devices, tests replay attacks on command frames, attempts network key extraction, and tests coordinator spoofing to take control of the network.
14. Mobile Application Security
Mobile application security testing covers both Android (APK/AAB) and iOS (IPA) applications through static analysis, dynamic runtime instrumentation, network traffic interception, and component-level vulnerability assessment. Mobile applications present unique attack surfaces: local data storage, inter-process communication, certificate pinning implementation, biometric authentication bypass, and platform-specific permission models. PhantomYerra's mobile testing suite covers the OWASP Mobile Top 10 (2024) comprehensively across six specialized engines.
14.1 YerraADB - Android Debug Bridge Tester
Interfaces with Android devices for package extraction, application data dump, filesystem access, process analysis, and logcat monitoring for sensitive data leakage. Checks for debugging enabled, backup allowed, insecure exported components, and world-readable files in the application's sandbox.
What information is needed
- Android device or emulator with USB debugging enabled
- Target application package name (e.g.,
com.example.app) - Root access preferred (but not required for many tests)
How the test works step-by-step
- Package Extraction - Pulls the installed APK from the device for static analysis, including split APKs for app bundles.
- Manifest Analysis - Parses
AndroidManifest.xmlfor: debuggable flag, backup flag, exported components, custom permissions, minimum SDK (targeting old Android versions reduces security). - Data Storage Review - Examines shared preferences, SQLite databases, internal/external storage for sensitive data stored in plaintext: credentials, tokens, PII, encryption keys.
- Logcat Monitoring - Captures application logs during runtime looking for leaked credentials, API keys, session tokens, and PII in log output.
- Component Testing - Tests exported activities (can they be launched directly?), content providers (SQL injection, path traversal), broadcast receivers (intent injection), and services (unauthorized access).
14.2 YerraMITM - Mobile Traffic Interceptor
SSL/TLS interception with certificate pinning bypass. Captures and modifies all HTTP/HTTPS traffic between the mobile app and its backend servers. Detects: tokens transmitted in plaintext or URL parameters, unauthenticated API endpoints, PII sent without encryption, debug endpoints accessible in production builds, and hardcoded API keys in request headers.
Certificate pinning bypass
Applications that implement certificate pinning resist standard proxy interception. YerraMITM uses Frida scripts to hook into the SSL/TLS validation functions at runtime, disabling pinning checks while preserving all other TLS behavior. This works on both Android (OkHttp, Conscrypt, standard Java SSL) and iOS (NSURLSession, ATS, AFNetworking) pinning implementations.
14.3 YerraDrozer - Android Component Analyzer
Deep analysis of Android application components: Activities, Services, Content Providers, and Broadcast Receivers. Tests exported component abuse, intent injection, SQL injection in content providers, path traversal in file providers, and IPC security issues. Discovers the full application attack surface including undocumented components.
14.4 YerraFrida - Dynamic Instrumentation
Runtime instrumentation for both Android and iOS applications. Capabilities include: bypass root/jailbreak detection, disable certificate pinning, intercept cryptographic operations (capture keys and plaintext), trace API calls, modify function return values, dump decrypted network traffic, and hook into authentication functions to extract credentials.
Common Frida use cases in assessments
- Bypassing biometric authentication by hooking the authentication callback to always return success
- Extracting encryption keys from memory during runtime
- Modifying security checks (root detection, debugger detection, emulator detection) to enable testing on rooted/jailbroken devices
- Tracing all network API calls to identify undocumented endpoints
14.5 YerraiOSStatic / YerraiOSDynamic - iOS Analysis
Static Analysis: IPA binary inspection including Info.plist settings, entitlements, App Transport Security (ATS) exceptions, insecure URL schemes, hardcoded credentials, weak cryptographic usage, and debuggable builds. Checks for PIE (Position Independent Executable), stack canaries, and ARC (Automatic Reference Counting). Dynamic Analysis: Runtime analysis on jailbroken devices covering filesystem monitoring (Keychain access, plist files), network communications, clipboard usage, keyboard caching, screenshot caching, and pasteboard data leakage.
14.6 YerraMobSF - Mobile Security Framework
All-in-one mobile assessment combining static analysis (decompilation, manifest review, code pattern scanning), dynamic analysis (runtime monitoring, API fuzzing, traffic capture), and malware behavior analysis for both APK/AAB and IPA formats. Produces a full security scorecard mapped to the OWASP Mobile Top 10 (2024), with each finding including the specific MSTG (Mobile Security Testing Guide) test case reference.
OWASP Mobile Top 10 coverage
| ID | Category | YerraMobSF Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| M1 | Improper Credential Usage | Hardcoded credentials, insecure storage, token handling |
| M2 | Inadequate Supply Chain Security | Third-party SDK analysis, library vulnerabilities |
| M3 | Insecure Authentication | Biometric bypass, session management, local auth |
| M4 | Insufficient Input Validation | SQL injection, XSS in WebViews, intent injection |
| M5 | Insecure Communication | TLS config, pinning, plaintext traffic, mixed content |
| M6 | Inadequate Privacy Controls | PII exposure, analytics tracking, data collection |
| M7 | Insufficient Binary Protection | Code obfuscation, anti-tamper, debuggable flag |
| M8 | Security Misconfiguration | Backup flag, exported components, permissions |
| M9 | Insecure Data Storage | SharedPrefs, SQLite, Keychain, external storage |
| M10 | Insufficient Cryptography | Weak algorithms, hardcoded keys, insecure RNG |
15. Firmware Analysis
Firmware analysis is the process of extracting, deconstructing, and examining the software embedded in hardware devices. Firmware runs on routers, IoT devices, industrial controllers, medical equipment, automotive ECUs, and virtually every connected device. Vulnerabilities in firmware are particularly severe because patching requires device-level updates that many organizations delay or skip entirely. PhantomYerra's firmware analysis suite extracts firmware images, identifies embedded components, discovers hardcoded secrets, matches known CVEs, and performs deep binary analysis to uncover backdoors and memory corruption vulnerabilities.
15.1 YerraCVEBin - Binary CVE Checker
Scans firmware images to identify embedded software components (OpenSSL, BusyBox, curl, zlib, glibc, dnsmasq, lighttpd, and hundreds more) by version strings and binary patterns, then cross-references each component against the NVD for known CVEs.
How it works
- Binary Pattern Matching - Scans the firmware image for version strings embedded in binaries (e.g.,
OpenSSL 1.0.1e,BusyBox v1.26.2) using a database of known version string patterns. - CPE Mapping - Maps identified components to CPE (Common Platform Enumeration) identifiers for accurate NVD lookup.
- CVE Cross-Reference - Queries the NVD for all CVEs affecting each identified component version, including CVSS scores and exploit availability.
- Exploitability Assessment - For each CVE, checks ExploitDB and GitHub for public exploit code. Available exploits are flagged for potential validation.
15.2 YerraEMBA - Firmware Extraction & Analysis
Full firmware analysis: extraction (binwalk, unsquashfs, ubi_reader, jefferson for JFFS2, and 100+ additional formats), filesystem mapping, binary analysis (hardcoded passwords, unsafe C functions like strcpy/sprintf, static keys), CVE matching against all identified components, configuration review, and secret discovery across all extracted files.
What information is needed
- Firmware image file (binary blob, update package, or extracted flash dump)
- Device model and manufacturer (optional; aids in identification)
- Expected filesystem type if known (squashfs, cramfs, JFFS2, UBIFS, ext4)
Extraction methodology
The engine recursively extracts nested archives and filesystems: an update package may contain a compressed image that contains a squashfs filesystem that contains gzipped configuration files. Each layer is extracted and analyzed until no more nested content remains. The final output is a complete directory tree of all files in the firmware.
15.3 YerraFirmwalker - Firmware Secret Scanner
Scans extracted firmware filesystems for: /etc/shadow password hashes, SSH host keys and authorized keys, SSL/TLS certificates and private keys, database files (SQLite, BDB), configuration files containing credentials, scripts with hardcoded passwords, .htpasswd files, and any file containing patterns matching API keys, tokens, or connection strings.
Example findings
| Finding | Location | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| Hardcoded root password hash (crackable) | /etc/shadow | CRITICAL |
| SSH private key (shared across all devices) | /etc/dropbear/dropbear_rsa_host_key | CRITICAL |
| AWS access key in configuration script | /opt/cloud/config.sh | CRITICAL |
| Self-signed TLS certificate with private key | /etc/ssl/private/server.key | HIGH |
15.4 YerraGhidra - Firmware Decompiler
Decompiles firmware binaries across multiple architectures (ARM, MIPS, x86, x86_64, PowerPC, AArch64) to C-like pseudocode. Automated analysis identifies: authentication bypass logic (hardcoded credential comparisons), backdoor accounts (hidden username/password checks), hardcoded encryption keys, and exploitable memory corruption patterns (buffer overflows, format string vulnerabilities, use-after-free conditions).
AI-assisted binary analysis
The AI orchestrator reviews decompiled code from Ghidra, identifying suspicious patterns that automated rules may miss: custom authentication schemes with logic flaws, cryptographic implementations with key reuse or weak initialization vectors, command injection in CGI handlers, and intentional backdoors disguised as debug interfaces.
16. Reverse Engineering
Reverse engineering provides the deepest level of binary analysis, used when source code is unavailable and the target is a compiled binary, library, or hardware firmware. PhantomYerra's reverse engineering suite combines automated symbolic execution, interactive disassembly, visual analysis, and dynamic debugging to identify vulnerabilities that cannot be found through any other testing method. The AI orchestrator directs the analysis process, focusing attention on authentication routines, cryptographic operations, input parsing functions, and privilege escalation paths.
16.1 YerraAngr - Symbolic Execution
Explores all execution paths through a binary using constraint solving to discover: crash-triggering inputs, authentication bypass inputs, buffer overflow conditions, and path constraints that lead to privileged code sections. Supports x86, x86_64, ARM, MIPS, and PowerPC architectures.
What information is needed
- Target binary file (ELF, PE, Mach-O)
- Entry point or specific function to analyze (optional; defaults to
main) - Known good/bad program states to guide analysis (optional)
How symbolic execution works
- State Initialization - Creates a symbolic state where inputs are represented as symbolic variables rather than concrete values.
- Path Exploration - Executes the binary symbolically, forking at each branch condition to explore both paths. Each path accumulates constraints on the symbolic inputs.
- Constraint Solving - When a target state is reached (crash, authentication success, privileged function), the constraint solver (Z3) produces concrete input values that trigger that path.
- Vulnerability Confirmation - Generated inputs are tested against the actual binary to confirm the vulnerability. Crash inputs are classified by vulnerability type (stack overflow, heap overflow, format string, null dereference).
16.2 YerraDisasm - Interactive Disassembler
Deep reverse engineering: disassembly, decompilation to C-like pseudocode, function identification, cross-reference resolution, and data type annotation. The AI analyzes decompiled code for authentication bypass conditions, cryptographic weaknesses, backdoor logic, and unsafe memory operations.
AI-directed analysis workflow
The AI orchestrator identifies high-value analysis targets: functions containing string comparisons (potential hardcoded credentials), functions calling cryptographic APIs (potential weak crypto), functions accepting network input (potential injection points), and functions with privilege-changing system calls (potential escalation paths). Each identified target receives focused manual-equivalent analysis.
16.3 YerraCutter - Binary Analysis Platform
Visual binary analysis providing: control flow graphs (visualizing function logic), call graphs (showing which functions call which), hex viewing and editing, Python scripting for custom analysis, CPU emulation for tracing execution, and YARA rule creation for malware detection. Particularly useful for analyzing obfuscated binaries where the visual control flow graph reveals the true logic despite obfuscation attempts.
16.4 YerraDebug - x64 Debugger
Dynamic binary analysis on Windows: hardware and software breakpoints, execution tracing, memory read/write monitoring, register modification, and runtime behavior analysis. Used for: exploit development (finding exact crash offset, ROP gadget testing), obfuscated code analysis (watching runtime unpacking), anti-debugging technique identification and bypass, and runtime decryption capture (breaking on CryptDecrypt to capture plaintext).
17. Wireless Security
Wireless security testing assesses WiFi networks, Bluetooth, and related wireless protocols for vulnerabilities that could allow unauthorized access, traffic interception, or man-in-the-middle attacks. Wireless networks extend the organization's attack surface beyond the physical perimeter, making them a primary target for adversaries seeking initial access. PhantomYerra's wireless suite covers the full spectrum from reconnaissance through exploitation, including modern WPA3 attacks and client-side wireless manipulation.
17.1 YerraWiFi - Wireless Network Auditor
Full WiFi security assessment covering discovery, authentication attacks, and client-side exploitation.
What information is needed
- Wireless network adapter capable of monitor mode and packet injection
- Target network SSID and/or BSSID (or all networks in range for broad assessment)
- Physical proximity to the target network
Assessment methodology
- Discovery - Monitor mode captures all beacon frames within range, identifying SSIDs, BSSIDs, encryption types, channels, client associations, and hidden networks.
- WPA/WPA2 Assessment - Captures the 4-way handshake (via deauthentication or passive wait) or extracts PMKID from the first EAPOL frame. Captured material is tested against wordlists and rules.
- WPA3 Assessment - Tests for Dragonblood vulnerabilities (CVE-2019-9494/9496), downgrade attacks from WPA3 to WPA2, side-channel attacks on the SAE handshake.
- WEP Cracking: ARP replay attack to generate IVs, then FMS/PTW statistical attack for key recovery. WEP is broken regardless of key length.
- Evil Twin - Creates a rogue access point mimicking the target network to capture credentials from connecting clients.
- Client-Side Attacks - Exploits probe request leakage (devices broadcasting previously connected SSIDs) and KARMA attacks (responding to all probe requests to lure client connections).
Example findings
| Finding | Severity |
|---|---|
| WPA2-PSK cracked: password is "Company2024!" | CRITICAL |
| WPA3 transition mode allows WPA2 downgrade | HIGH |
| Guest network shares same VLAN as corporate | HIGH |
| WEP network still active (key recovered in 3 minutes) | CRITICAL |
| Probe requests reveal employee home networks | LOW |
17.2 YerraNetAttack - Network Attack Framework
Man-in-the-middle attack framework for local network exploitation: ARP spoofing to intercept traffic, DNS spoofing to redirect connections, HTTPS downgrade (SSLStrip) to capture plaintext credentials, credential sniffing on HTTP/FTP/SMTP/POP3, WiFi deauthentication for denial-of-service and handshake capture, and BLE device reconnaissance. Demonstrates the impact of network-level access gained through wireless compromise.
18. Password & Credential Testing
Password and credential testing assesses the strength of authentication mechanisms through offline hash cracking and targeted wordlist generation. Weak passwords remain one of the most exploited vulnerabilities: they provide initial access, enable lateral movement, and unlock encrypted data. PhantomYerra generates target-specific wordlists based on organizational intelligence and applies them against captured authentication material using optimized cracking strategies.
18.1 YerraWordlistGen - Custom Wordlist Generator
Generates target-specific wordlists by crawling organization websites to extract: company name variations, product names, employee names, location names, and industry terms. Applies full mutation rules: capitalization patterns, number appending (1-9999), special character substitution, year patterns (2020-2026), leet speak conversion, and keyboard pattern generation.
Wordlist generation strategy
- Base Word Collection - Crawls the organization's website extracting all unique words, names, and terms.
- OSINT Enrichment - Adds employee names from LinkedIn/public sources, office locations, product/service names.
- Mutation Rules - Applies password creation patterns observed in real breach datasets:
Company2024!,P@ssw0rd,Summer2025#. - Output Tiers - Quick (100K entries, ~5 minutes cracking), thorough (10M entries, ~2 hours), exhaustive (100M+ entries, ~24 hours).
18.2 YerraCrack - Password Cracker
Offline password cracking supporting hundreds of hash formats: NTLM, NTLMv2, Kerberos TGS (TGS-REP, AS-REP), WPA/WPA2, bcrypt, scrypt, Argon2, SHA-256/512, MD5, MSSQL, Oracle, MySQL, PostgreSQL, and application-specific formats (WordPress, Drupal, phpBB, Joomla).
Attack modes
| Mode | Description | Use Case |
|---|---|---|
| Dictionary | Tries every word in the wordlist | Quick wins against common passwords |
| Rules | Applies transformation rules (capitalize, append numbers, leet speak) to dictionary words | Catches password patterns like "Password1!" |
| Incremental | Systematic brute-force through all character combinations | Short passwords, specific character sets |
| Hybrid | Dictionary + incremental appended characters | "admin" + 4 digit PIN patterns |
| Prince | Generates word combinations from dictionary entries | Passphrase patterns like "correcthorsebattery" |
Example findings
| Hash Source | Cracked Password | Time | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| Domain admin NTLM | Welcome2024! | 3 seconds | CRITICAL |
| Kerberoasted service account | Svc_sql_prod1 | 12 minutes | CRITICAL |
| WPA2 handshake | CompanyName2024 | 45 minutes | CRITICAL |
| Web application bcrypt | Not cracked (strong hash + password) | 24h limit reached | INFO (properly secured) |
19. Phishing & Social Engineering
Phishing and social engineering testing evaluates the human element of security: the most frequently exploited attack vector in real-world breaches. PhantomYerra conducts authorized phishing simulations that replicate the techniques used by actual threat actors, including reverse-proxy credential harvesting that captures credentials and MFA tokens in real time. These campaigns measure organizational resilience and identify employees who require additional security awareness training.
19.1 YerraPhish - Phishing & Credential Harvesting
Authorized phishing simulations using reverse-proxy technology. Acts as a transparent proxy between the victim and the real authentication page, capturing credentials and session tokens including MFA tokens (TOTP, push notifications, WebAuthn where supported). Pre-built phishlet templates for Microsoft 365, Google Workspace, Okta, and Duo.
What information is needed
- Signed authorization letter specifying target employee list and campaign scope
- Domain for the phishing landing page (similar to target organization's domain)
- Target authentication platform (Microsoft 365, Google, Okta, custom)
- Campaign parameters: duration, email template, landing page design
How the campaign works
- Phishlet Configuration - A phishlet (reverse-proxy configuration) is prepared for the target authentication provider. Custom phishlets can be created for any web application.
- Domain Setup - The phishing domain receives a valid TLS certificate. The reverse proxy is configured to transparently forward traffic to the real authentication server.
- Email Delivery - Phishing emails are sent to the target list with crafted pretexts (password reset, document share, security alert). Email headers mimic legitimate sender patterns.
- Credential Capture - When a target visits the phishing page, they see the real login page. Credentials are captured as they flow through the proxy. MFA tokens are also captured in real time.
- Campaign Tracking - Metrics are recorded: emails sent, emails opened, links clicked, credentials entered, MFA completed, sessions captured. Each metric is time-stamped per recipient.
Campaign results
| Metric | Description |
|---|---|
| Click Rate | Percentage of recipients who clicked the phishing link |
| Credential Submit Rate | Percentage who entered credentials on the phishing page |
| MFA Bypass Rate | Percentage who completed MFA through the proxy |
| Report Rate | Percentage who reported the phishing email to IT/security |
| Time to Click | Median time from email delivery to first click |
20. Red Team Operations
Red team operations simulate advanced persistent threat (APT) behavior across the full kill chain: initial access, execution, persistence, privilege escalation, defense evasion, credential access, lateral movement, collection, and exfiltration. PhantomYerra's red team engine provides command-and-control (C2) infrastructure with multiple communication channels, implant generation for all major platforms, and post-exploitation capabilities that replicate what real threat actors deploy after initial compromise.
20.1 YerraC2 - Command & Control Framework
Full C2 capabilities for authorized red team engagements. Implant generation supports Windows, Linux, and macOS with multiple communication protocols (mTLS, WireGuard, HTTP/S, DNS tunneling).
Post-exploitation capabilities
| Category | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Process Injection | CreateRemoteThread, QueueUserAPC, Process Hollowing, Module Stomping |
| Credential Harvesting | LSASS memory dump, SAM database extraction, Mimikatz integration, Kerberos ticket extraction |
| Lateral Movement | PsExec, WMI, WinRM, SSH, DCOM, SMB named pipes |
| Persistence | Registry run keys, scheduled tasks, Windows services, WMI subscriptions, DLL search order hijacking |
| Defense Evasion | AMSI bypass, ETW patching, direct syscalls (bypassing API hooks), process ghosting, DLL sideloading |
| Pivoting | SOCKS proxy through compromised hosts, port forwarding, reverse tunneling |
MITRE ATT&CK mapping
Every post-exploitation action maps to the corresponding MITRE ATT&CK technique ID (e.g., T1055 Process Injection, T1003 Credential Dumping, T1021 Lateral Movement). The red team report includes a full ATT&CK navigator heatmap showing which techniques were successfully executed during the engagement.
21. Browser Exploitation
Browser exploitation demonstrates the full impact of cross-site scripting and client-side vulnerabilities by executing post-exploitation actions in the victim's browser context. When PhantomYerra discovers stored XSS or achieves browser control through social engineering, the browser exploitation engine takes over to prove what an attacker could achieve: session hijacking, internal network reconnaissance, credential theft, and persistent browser access.
21.1 YerraBrowserExploit - Browser Exploitation Framework
Hooks browsers via XSS or social engineering, then executes post-exploitation modules in the victim's browser context.
Post-hook capabilities
- Fingerprinting - Browser type/version, installed plugins, screen resolution, timezone, WebGL renderer, canvas fingerprint
- Internal Scanning - Port scan the internal network from the victim's browser perspective using WebSocket connections, discovering services invisible from the external network
- Credential Capture - Inject fake login dialogs, capture form submissions, access stored passwords through browser APIs
- Session Hijacking - Extract cookies, session tokens, and LocalStorage/SessionStorage data
- Keystroke Capture - Log all keystrokes in the hooked browser tab
- Persistent Access - Maintain hook across page navigation using iframe injection or service worker registration
- Phishing Redirect - Redirect to a credential harvesting page designed to match the victim's current context
AI attack chain integration
The AI orchestrator automatically chains XSS findings into browser exploitation: a stored XSS on a user profile page triggers browser hooking, which then executes internal network scanning, revealing previously unknown internal services that become new targets in the attack graph.
22. Secrets Scanning
Secrets scanning identifies credentials, API keys, tokens, and other sensitive data inadvertently committed to source code repositories. Leaked secrets are a leading cause of cloud breaches: a single AWS access key committed to a public repository can be exploited within minutes by automated scanners. PhantomYerra scans the entire Git history (not just the current HEAD), because secrets that were committed and subsequently deleted are still recoverable from Git's object store and remain exploitable.
22.1 YerraSecretsScan - Secrets Detection Engine
Scans source code repositories including the entire Git history, all branches, and all tags. Detects: AWS key pairs, GCP service account JSON, Azure connection strings, GitHub/GitLab tokens, Slack/Discord webhooks, database connection strings, JWT signing secrets, private keys (RSA, EC, SSH), SMTP credentials, and SaaS API keys (Stripe, Twilio, SendGrid). Each detected secret is automatically tested for liveness - active secrets are Critical, revoked secrets are Informational.
What information is needed
- Git repository path (local clone) or remote URL with access credentials
- Scan scope: current HEAD only, specific branch, or full history (all commits, all branches)
- Custom regex patterns for organization-specific secret formats (optional)
How the scan works step-by-step
- History Traversal - Walks every commit in the repository's history, examining each diff for patterns matching known secret formats.
- Pattern Matching - Applies 700+ regex patterns covering cloud providers, SaaS services, databases, messaging platforms, and generic high-entropy strings.
- Entropy Analysis - Identifies high-entropy strings that may be secrets even without matching a known pattern. Shannon entropy above threshold triggers manual review.
- Liveness Testing - For each detected secret: attempts a non-destructive API call to verify if the credential is still active. AWS keys are tested with
sts:GetCallerIdentity; GitHub tokens with/user; Stripe keys with a read-only call. - Finding Classification - Active secrets are classified Critical with immediate remediation. Revoked secrets are classified Informational with rotation confirmation. Secrets in old commits that never reached production are classified Low.
Example findings
| Secret Type | Location | Status | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
AWS Access Key (AKIA...) | config.py (commit 3a2f1b, 2023-08-15) | ACTIVE | CRITICAL |
| GitHub Personal Access Token | .env (commit e9d4c2, 2024-01-20) | REVOKED | INFO |
Stripe Secret Key (sk_live_...) | payment.js (HEAD) | ACTIVE | CRITICAL |
| RSA Private Key | deploy/key.pem (commit 7bc913) | ACTIVE | CRITICAL |
23. Automotive Security
Automotive security testing assesses connected vehicle systems for vulnerabilities in their communication buses, diagnostic interfaces, telematics units, and vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communications. Modern vehicles contain 100+ Electronic Control Units (ECUs) communicating over CAN bus, LIN, FlexRay, and automotive Ethernet. Telematics Control Units (TCUs) connect vehicles to cellular networks and cloud services, creating remote attack surfaces. PhantomYerra's automotive suite covers the entire vehicle attack surface from physical bus interfaces to remote API exploitation.
23.1 YerraAutomotive - Vehicle Security Suite
CAN Bus Testing (CanUtilsAdapter)
Captures CAN bus traffic to decode message identifiers, arbitration IDs, and payload structures. Tests include: message replay attacks (replaying captured door unlock messages), CAN injection (sending crafted messages to control vehicle functions), bus-off attacks (forcing an ECU off the bus through error frame flooding), and anomaly detection to identify ECUs communicating outside expected patterns.
UDS Diagnostics (UDSimAdapter)
Tests Unified Diagnostic Services (ISO 14229): unauthorized diagnostic session access (default security seeds, brute-force seed/key), DTC read/clear without authorization, memory read/write via diagnostic services, ECU identification and firmware version extraction, and unauthorized firmware update via UDS TransferData service.
OBD-II Testing (OBD2Adapter)
Data extraction via the OBD-II diagnostic port: VIN retrieval, sensor data (speed, RPM, fuel, temperatures), ECU enumeration, and CAN injection through the diagnostic connector. The OBD-II port provides physical access to the vehicle's CAN bus network.
V2X Communications (V2XScannerAdapter)
Tests Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communications: Basic Safety Message (BSM) spoofing, GPS position manipulation, certificate validation testing, privacy leakage analysis (tracking vehicles via BSM data), and denial-of-service through message flooding.
Telematics API (TCUAPIAdapter)
Tests vehicle cloud APIs: authentication bypass, unauthorized vehicle commands (lock/unlock, start/stop engine, location tracking, geofence modification), session hijacking between vehicles and mobile apps, and firmware update manipulation.
Example findings
| Finding | Component | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| Door unlock via CAN message replay (no rolling code) | CAN Bus | CRITICAL |
| TCU API allows unauthenticated vehicle location query | Telematics | HIGH |
| UDS diagnostic session accessible without security seed | OBD-II | HIGH |
| BSM messages contain persistent vehicle identifier | V2X | MEDIUM |
24. Medical Device Security
Medical device testing follows FDA premarket cybersecurity guidance. All tests are passive or read-only. No modifications are made to device configurations, patient data, or operational parameters. Testing is conducted with explicit authorization from the healthcare organization's information security and biomedical engineering teams.
Medical device security testing assesses the security posture of connected healthcare devices, clinical systems, and health data APIs. Medical devices present unique risks: patient safety depends on device availability and integrity, and protected health information (PHI) exposure creates HIPAA liability. Many medical devices run outdated operating systems, use legacy protocols without encryption, and lack basic authentication mechanisms. PhantomYerra's medical testing suite addresses device-level, protocol-level, and API-level security across the healthcare environment.
24.1 YerraMedDevice - Medical Device Scanner
Identifies and assesses medical devices across the network: infusion pumps, patient monitors, imaging systems (CT, MRI, X-ray), lab instruments, clinical workstations, and pharmacy automation systems.
Assessment methodology
- Device Discovery - Identifies medical devices through protocol fingerprinting (HL7, DICOM, FHIR, proprietary), banner analysis, and MAC address OUI lookup against medical device manufacturer databases.
- Credential Testing - Tests for default credentials documented in FDA advisories, ICS-CERT bulletins, and manufacturer documentation. Common: admin/admin, service/service, manufacturer-specific defaults.
- OS Assessment - Identifies the underlying operating system (many devices run Windows XP/7 Embedded, outdated Linux kernels) and checks for unpatched CVEs.
- Communication Security - Verifies that device-to-server and device-to-device communications use encryption. Many medical devices transmit patient data in plaintext over HL7v2 or unencrypted DICOM.
- Network Segmentation - Verifies that medical devices are properly segmented from general IT networks and guest WiFi, per FDA guidance and HIPAA technical safeguards.
24.2 YerraFHIR: FHIR API Tester
Tests HL7 FHIR (Fast Healthcare Interoperability Resources) APIs for security vulnerabilities. Covers: SMART on FHIR authentication and authorization (OAuth 2.0 scopes), patient data access control (can one patient access another's records?), bulk data export security (who can trigger bulk exports?), search parameter injection, and FHIR-specific resource access control violations. Verifies HIPAA Security Rule compliance for API-based PHI access.
Access control testing
Tests whether the FHIR API properly enforces patient compartment boundaries: User A should only access their own Patient, Observation, MedicationRequest, and related resources. The engine systematically attempts to access other patients' resources by manipulating resource IDs, search parameters, and _include/_revinclude references.
24.3 YerraDICOM: DICOM Protocol Tester
Tests DICOM (Digital Imaging and Communications in Medicine) services for security weaknesses. DICOM is the standard protocol for medical imaging, and many PACS (Picture Archiving and Communication System) implementations lack authentication.
DICOM service operations tested
| Operation | Test | Impact if Vulnerable |
|---|---|---|
| C-ECHO | Unauthenticated connectivity verification | Confirms DICOM service is reachable |
| C-FIND | Patient data query without authorization | PHI disclosure: patient names, IDs, study dates |
| C-MOVE | Image transfer to unauthorized destination | Medical image exfiltration with embedded PHI |
| C-STORE | Image upload without authorization | Data integrity: injecting false medical images |
| WADO-RS | Web access to DICOM objects via REST API | Browser-based PHI access without authentication |
HIPAA implications
Unauthenticated DICOM access exposes Protected Health Information (PHI) including patient names, dates of birth, medical record numbers, and diagnostic images. This constitutes a HIPAA breach requiring notification. Every DICOM finding includes the HIPAA Security Rule control reference (164.312) for compliance reporting.
25. Robotics & Industrial Robot Security
Robotics security testing assesses industrial robots, collaborative robots (cobots), autonomous systems, and their communication infrastructure. Industrial robots in manufacturing, logistics, and healthcare operate in environments where unauthorized control can cause physical damage, injury, and production disruption. These systems use protocols designed for reliability and real-time performance, often with minimal security. PhantomYerra tests the robot's communication protocols, web management interfaces, control software, and network isolation.
25.1 YerraRobotics - Robotics Security Suite
DDS Testing (DDSScannerAdapter)
Tests Data Distribution Service (DDS) middleware used by ROS2 and many industrial systems: discovers DDS domains and topics, tests for unencrypted topic data, attempts unauthenticated publish/subscribe operations, enumerates domain IDs to discover all DDS networks on the segment, and tests control topic injection to send unauthorized commands to robot actuators.
OPC UA Testing (OPCUAAdapter)
Tests OPC UA (Unified Architecture) servers used in industrial automation: anonymous access testing, security mode enforcement verification (None vs Sign vs SignAndEncrypt), certificate validation testing, method execution authorization (can an unauthenticated client call control methods?), and node browsing to map the entire object hierarchy including robot configuration, programs, and I/O points.
ROS Testing (ROSPenToAdapter)
Tests Robot Operating System (ROS/ROS2) deployments: unauthenticated topic subscription (eavesdropping on sensor data, camera feeds, position data), service command injection (calling robot services to execute movements), parameter manipulation (changing safety limits, speed boundaries, workspace definitions), and unauthorized robot program upload/execution.
Web Controller Testing (RobotWebControllerAdapter)
Tests robot web management interfaces for ABB, KUKA, Fanuc, Universal Robots, and other manufacturers: default credential testing (common: admin/admin, User/User, operator/kuka), unauthenticated access to teach pendant interfaces, command injection in web interface parameters, and unauthorized program upload/download through the web interface.
Example findings
| Finding | Protocol/Interface | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| DDS topic unencrypted, robot position data visible | DDS | HIGH |
| OPC UA server allows anonymous method execution | OPC UA | CRITICAL |
| ROS parameter server writable, safety limits modifiable | ROS | CRITICAL |
| KUKA web interface accessible with default credentials | Web Controller | CRITICAL |
| Robot program downloadable without authentication | Web Controller | HIGH |
26. Organizational Intelligence
26.1 Global Threat Engine
PhantomYerra maintains a real-time threat intelligence pipeline aggregating 20+ sources across three tiers:
| Tier | Sources |
|---|---|
| Community | BleepingComputer, The Hacker News, Krebs on Security, SecurityWeek, SANS ISC, Dark Reading |
| Vendor/Gov | Google Security Blog, Project Zero, MSRC, AWS Security Blog |
| Research Labs | Rapid7, Unit42, CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, CheckPoint, Google Threat Intelligence, Kaspersky, Cisco Talos, Malwarebytes, Recorded Future |
Intelligence is used to: prioritize findings based on active exploitation, enrich CVE data with threat actor context, and generate early warnings for newly disclosed vulnerabilities.
26.2 CISA KEV & NVD
The CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog is continuously monitored. Any scan finding appearing in KEV is automatically elevated in severity and flagged "Known Exploited - Immediate Remediation Required." The NVD CVE database is synced daily, enriching every finding with CVSS v3.1 vectors, CWE classification, and affected product configurations (CPE).
26.3 ExploitDB Integration
When a CVE is identified, ExploitDB is checked for public exploit code. Available exploits are analyzed by the AI, adapted to the target, and executed (with authorization) to validate. When no public exploit exists, the AI attempts proof-of-concept development through patch diff analysis and vulnerability description interpretation.
26.4 Attack Graph Construction
A live directed graph connects all findings through exploitation relationships. Reveals: shortest path from initial access to critical assets, maximum-impact finding chains, and which remediations eliminate the most attack paths. Included in every report.
26.5 Business Impact Assessment
Every finding receives impact assessment beyond CVSS: data accessible, operations disruptable, regulatory violations, attacker capability requirement, and expected financial impact. This contextualizes technical findings for executive stakeholders.
27. Exploitation Methodology
The exploitation methodology defines how PhantomYerra moves from "vulnerability detected" to "vulnerability confirmed with evidence." Every finding must survive this process before it reaches a report.
27.1 Universal Exploitation Decision Framework
For EVERY discovered vulnerability, the AI follows this structured process:
- Classify the finding - What vulnerability class? (SQLi, XSS, RCE, SSRF, misconfig, etc.)
- Assess exploitability - Is exploitation possible given authentication state, network position, WAF presence?
- Check environment type - Is exploitation authorized? (
live_productionrestricts destructive tests.) - Select payload strategy - Context-aware: technology stack, WAF type, encoding requirements.
- Execute with evidence capture - Full request/response evidence, SHA-256 hashed and timestamped.
- Validate result - Confirmed vulnerable (with proof), confirmed not vulnerable (with evidence), or inconclusive (with explanation).
- Assess impact - Data extractable? Code executable? Chainable with other findings?
- Document remediation - Specific, actionable steps with code examples. Not generic advice.
27.2 SQL Injection
Complete SQL Injection exploitation methodology
Starting the test
Target: any input point interacting with a database (URL parameters, POST body, headers, cookies, JSON fields).
Detection phase
- Single quote:
'- watch for SQL error messages - Boolean:
1 AND 1=1vs1 AND 1=2- compare response differences - Time-based:
1' AND SLEEP(5)--- measure 5-second delay - UNION:
' UNION SELECT NULL--with incrementing NULLs
Database identification
MySQL (VERSION()), PostgreSQL (version()), MSSQL (@@version), Oracle (BANNER FROM V$VERSION), SQLite (sqlite_version()).
Exploitation by type
- Error-based:
EXTRACTVALUE(),UPDATEXML(),CONVERT() - UNION-based:
UNION SELECT username,password FROM users-- - Boolean blind:
SUBSTRING(user(),1,1)='r'binary search - Time-based blind: Same logic via
SLEEP()/WAITFOR DELAY/pg_sleep() - Out-of-band:
LOAD_FILE(), DNS exfiltration,UTL_HTTP
WAF bypass payloads
/*!50000UNION*/, inline comments (/**/), case randomization (uNiOn SeLeCt), double URL encoding (%2527), Unicode normalization, null bytes.
Attempt count
Up to 500 payload variants per injection point. Starts with most likely payloads, progressively escalates.
Confirming NOT exploitable
All standard payloads, all encoding variants, all injection types (error, union, boolean, time, OOB) tested. No response differences or timing anomalies. Evidence includes full payload list and response signatures.
Confirming zero-day
Check NVD/CVE/ExploitDB for matching product/version. No match = potential zero-day, flagged for responsible disclosure with detailed advisory.
Exploiting CVE without public exploit
Analyze CVE description, perform patch diff analysis if patch available, understand root cause from diff, craft PoC, test against target, document entire process.
27.3 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
Complete XSS exploitation methodology
Process
- Inject canary string, observe reflection context.
- Generate context-specific breakout payloads.
- Test with progressive encoding/bypass techniques.
- Confirm via DOM changes, OOB callbacks, or triggered network requests.
Payloads by context
| Context | Payloads |
|---|---|
| HTML body | <script>alert(1)</script>, <img src=x onerror=alert(1)>, <svg/onload=alert(1)> |
| Attribute | " onfocus=alert(1) autofocus=", ' onmouseover=alert(1) ' |
| JS string | ';alert(1)//, ${alert(1)} |
| URL/href | javascript:alert(1), data:text/html,... |
WAF bypasses
Case mixing, double encoding, tag alternatives (<details open ontoggle>), polyglots, null bytes.
27.4 Command Injection
Complete command injection methodology
Detection: ; id, | id, `id`, $(id), ; sleep 5, OOB DNS (; nslookup oob.callback). Exploitation: Confirm OS type, read sensitive files (/etc/passwd, win.ini), determine privileges (id, whoami /priv), establish reverse shell or webshell.
27.5 SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery)
Complete SSRF methodology
Detection: OOB URL in URL-accepting parameters. Exploitation: Cloud metadata (169.254.169.254), internal service scanning, protocol smuggling (gopher://, file://, dict://). Bypasses: URL encoding, alternative IP representations (0x7f000001), DNS rebinding, URL redirect chains.
27.6 SSTI (Server-Side Template Injection)
Complete SSTI methodology
Detection: {{7*7}} = 49 (Jinja2/Twig), ${7*7} (Java EL), #{7*7} (Thymeleaf). RCE payloads: Jinja2: {{config.__class__.__init__.__globals__['os'].popen('id').read()}}; FreeMarker: ${"freemarker.template.utility.Execute"?new()("id")}; Twig: {{_self.env.registerUndefinedFilterCallback("exec")}}.
27.7 Additional Vulnerability Classes
| Class | Detection | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| Insecure Deserialization | Base64 blobs: Java rO0AB, PHP O:4:"User", .NET AAEAAAD, Python gASV | RCE via gadget chain exploitation |
| XXE | External entity in XML: <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd"> | File read, SSRF, blind exfiltration, DoS |
| Path Traversal / LFI | ../../etc/passwd, encoded variants | Local file read, RCE via log poisoning |
| Open Redirect | External URL in redirect parameters | Phishing amplification, OAuth token theft |
| CRLF Injection | %0d%0a in headers | Response splitting, header injection, XSS |
| Prototype Pollution | __proto__ in JSON bodies | XSS, privilege escalation, DoS in Node.js |
| NoSQL Injection | {"$gt": ""} in MongoDB | Authentication bypass, data extraction |
| LDAP Injection | *)(uid=*))(|(uid=* | Authentication bypass, data extraction |
| GraphQL Introspection | __schema { types { name } } | Full API schema disclosure |
| HTTP Request Smuggling | Conflicting CL/TE headers | Cache poisoning, auth bypass, credential theft |
| CORS Misconfiguration | Arbitrary Origin reflected | Cross-origin data theft from authenticated sessions |
| JWT Vulnerabilities | Algorithm confusion, none alg, key brute-force | Authentication bypass, privilege escalation |
| WebSocket Hijacking | Cross-origin WS without origin check | Session hijacking, unauthorized data access |
| Race Conditions | Concurrent requests to state-changing endpoints | Double spending, coupon reuse, vote manipulation |
28. Reporting
28.1 Report Types
| Format | Use Case | Features |
|---|---|---|
| Client delivery, formal reports | Professional layout, charts, evidence screenshots, ToC, page numbers | |
| DOCX | Editable reports for pentest teams | Customizable templates, merge fields, comment support |
| HTML | Interactive viewing, web portals | Sortable tables, collapsible findings, search, evidence zoom |
| JSON/SARIF | CI/CD integration, automation | Machine-readable, SARIF for IDE integration |
28.2 AI-Written Narratives
- Executive Summary - Non-technical overview for C-suite and board audiences.
- Finding Narratives - Professional prose explaining what was found, why it matters, how it was exploited, and business impact. Not data dumps.
- Attack Chain Narratives - Full story of multi-step attack paths from initial access to maximum impact.
- Remediation Guidance - Specific, actionable steps with corrected code examples where applicable.
28.3 Evidence Chain of Custody
SHA-256 hash on every evidence file at creation. RFC 3161 timestamps. Custody log: who captured, when, through which tool, unmodified since. Report includes hashes for verification.
28.4 Remediation Prioritization
| Factor | Weight |
|---|---|
| CVSS Score | 30% |
| Exploitability (public exploit?) | 25% |
| Business Impact (data sensitivity, disruption) | 25% |
| Exposure (internet-facing, auth required?) | 10% |
| Known Exploitation (CISA KEV, active campaigns) | 10% |
29. Compliance Frameworks
29.1 OWASP Top 10 (2021)
| ID | Category | PhantomYerra Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| A01 | Broken Access Control | YerraLogicTest (IDOR, BOLA, BFLA), YerraDASTOrch |
| A02 | Cryptographic Failures | YerraTLS, YerraSAST, YerraSecretsScan |
| A03 | Injection | YerraDASTOrch, YerraXSS, YerraSAST |
| A04 | Insecure Design | YerraLogicTest, AI analysis |
| A05 | Security Misconfiguration | YerraScan, YerraSurface, YerraIaCGuard, YerraTFSec |
| A06 | Vulnerable Components | YerraSCA, YerraCVEBin |
| A07 | Authentication Failures | YerraDASTOrch, YerraCMS, YerraLogicTest |
| A08 | Data Integrity Failures | YerraSAST (deserialization), YerraSCA (supply chain) |
| A09 | Logging Failures | YerraSurface, AI analysis |
| A10 | SSRF | YerraDASTOrch, YerraOOB |
29.2 OWASP LLM Top 10 (2025)
Full coverage via YerraPromptInject (LLM01), YerraDASTOrch (LLM02), YerraRAGProbe (LLM03, LLM06), YerraAISec (LLM04, LLM05, LLM07, LLM09, LLM10), YerraAgentHijack (LLM08).
29.3 CWE Mapping
Every finding includes CWE identifiers. Hierarchical: specific CWE (CWE-89: SQL Injection) rolls up to category (CWE-943) which rolls up to pillar (CWE-707). Reports group by CWE for developer-focused remediation.
29.4 NIST 800-53 Rev 5
Findings mapped to: AC (Access Control), AU (Audit), CA (Assessment), CM (Configuration), IA (Authentication), SC (Communications Protection), SI (System Integrity).
29.5 PCI DSS 4.0
Mapped to Requirements 1 (network controls), 2 (secure config), 3 (data at rest), 4 (data in transit), 5 (malware), 6 (secure dev), 7 (access control), 8 (authentication), 11 (security testing), 12 (organizational).
29.6 HIPAA
Mapped to HIPAA Security Rule: Administrative Safeguards, Physical Safeguards, Technical Safeguards. Critical for PHI exposure findings.
29.7 ISO 27001
Mapped to ISO 27001:2022 Annex A controls for ISMS risk treatment plan updates.
29.8 MITRE ATT&CK / ATLAS
| Tactic | PhantomYerra Coverage |
|---|---|
| Reconnaissance | YerraOSINT, YerraHarvest, YerraDeepRecon |
| Resource Development | YerraWordlistGen, YerraPhish |
| Initial Access | YerraScan, YerraPhish, YerraDASTOrch |
| Execution | YerraExploit, YerraFramework |
| Persistence | YerraC2 (implant persistence) |
| Privilege Escalation | YerraExploit, YerraAD (Kerberos attacks) |
| Defense Evasion | YerraC2 (process injection, AMSI bypass) |
| Credential Access | YerraCrack, YerraExploit, YerraPhish |
| Discovery | YerraRecon, YerraEnum, YerraAD |
| Lateral Movement | YerraExploit, YerraNetOps |
| Collection | YerraDASTOrch, YerraExploit |
| Exfiltration | YerraOOB, DNS tunneling |
| Impact | YerraFramework, YerraC2 |
30. Notifications & Integrations
30.1 YerraNotify - Multi-Channel Notifications
| Channel | Configuration | Events |
|---|---|---|
| SMTP server, recipients | Scan start/complete, Critical/High findings, daily digest | |
| Slack | Webhook URL or Bot token | Real-time findings with severity badges |
| Discord | Webhook URL | Embedded messages with finding details |
| Microsoft Teams | Incoming Webhook | Adaptive cards with action buttons |
| Generic Webhook | URL + auth headers | JSON payload for any event type |
| PagerDuty | Integration key | Critical findings trigger incidents |
| OpsGenie | API key | Critical findings create prioritized alerts |
30.2 CI/CD Pipeline Integration
- GitHub Actions: SAST/SCA/DAST on PRs with quality gates.
- GitLab CI - Pipeline stage with SARIF for Security Dashboard.
- Jenkins - Plugin for build-triggered scans.
- Azure DevOps - Task extension for pipeline integration.
- CLI Mode - Scriptable integration with any CI/CD system.
Quality gates: define threshold rules (e.g., "fail if any Critical or >5 High findings") that pass or fail pipeline stages automatically.
30.3 SIEM/SOAR Integration
- Splunk: HEC integration with pre-built dashboard.
- Elastic/ELK - Elasticsearch shipping for Kibana visualization.
- Azure Sentinel - Custom security alerts via Log Analytics API.
- Splunk SOAR - Automated playbook triggering on Critical findings.
30.4 Ticketing Systems
- Jira - Issue creation with severity-based priority, evidence attachments, remediation steps, project/field customization.
- ServiceNow - Incidents/change requests with CMDB asset linkage.
Appendix: Severity Taxonomy
| Severity | CVSS | Description | SLA |
|---|---|---|---|
| CRITICAL | 9.0-10.0 | Immediate exploitation: RCE, full data breach, domain admin. Often unauthenticated. | 24-48 hours |
| HIGH | 7.0-8.9 | Significant impact, low complexity: SQLi with extraction, stored XSS, auth bypass. | 7 days |
| MEDIUM | 4.0-6.9 | Moderate impact or special conditions: CSRF, reflected XSS, TLS issues. | 30 days |
| LOW | 0.1-3.9 | Minor: version disclosure, missing headers, verbose errors. | 90 days |
| INFO | 0.0 | Informational: technology fingerprinting, open ports with no vulnerable services. | Next assessment |
PhantomYerra adjusts severity contextually: a "Low" version disclosure becomes "Medium" when the version has known Critical CVEs. An "Info" finding becomes part of a "Critical" attack chain when combined with others.
SHA-256: 9154dbd53fb382f93d3ef639e42bec3e4a0c57db49337aebfac9f37e19ab5003
Signed: 2026-04-12
Verify: phantomyerra.com/SIGNATURES.json
Every update to this document refreshes the hash, timestamp, and signature. This is a real cryptographic seal, not a decoration.