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ISO 26262
ASIL A – D

TÜV-grade T2 tool qualification. ASIL D ready. 21 Part-6 control objectives mapped. Functional safety for road vehicles - the standard automotive OEMs and Tier-1 suppliers worldwide certify against. PhantomYerra ships the tool-qualification kit, the per-finding ASIL grading, and the audit-ready evidence packages that pair with MISRA + AUTOSAR scans.

21 Control Objectives T2 Tool Qualification ASIL A / B / C / D
At a glance

Functional Safety.
Pen-Test Receipts.

ISO 26262 - "Road vehicles - Functional safety" - is the 12-part standard governing E/E (electrical / electronic / programmable electronic) systems in production automotive. Part 6 covers software product development. PhantomYerra emits, for every software finding from a YerraSAST run, the applicable Part-6 control objective and the project's ASIL classification - enabling a single scan to feed both a safety report and a security report.

21
Part-6 control objectives
All mapped to detectors
T2
Tool qualification class
TCL2 / TD3 evidence pack
4
ASIL levels
A · B · C · D
100%
Verification objectives
§ 5.4.7 / § 8.4.5 / § 9.4
ASIL classification

Four Levels.
One Grading Engine.

ASIL - Automotive Safety Integrity Level - is the hazard-classification scheme ISO 26262 uses to drive design rigor. A is the lowest; D is the highest (worst case: typical fatality, no controllability). PhantomYerra grades every emitted finding with the ASIL of the containing component automatically, based on the workspace-declared item architecture.

A
Lowest integrity
Minor injury possible. Controllable in nearly all situations. PhantomYerra emits informational findings; build failures only for safety-blocking weakness classes.
B
Moderate integrity
Severe but survivable injuries possible. PhantomYerra emits soft-fail on Required-class MISRA / AUTOSAR violations; hard-fail on Mandatory.
C
High integrity
Life-threatening or fatal injuries possible. Hard-fail on Required + Mandatory. Cross-tool corroboration enabled by default for confidence floor.
D
Highest integrity
Typical fatality, low controllability. Hard-fail on every finding above LOW confidence. Deviation register requires double-signoff.
ISO 26262 Part 6

21 Control Objectives.
All Mapped.

Part 6 of ISO 26262 ("Product development at the software level") lists the activities and verification methods required at each ASIL. PhantomYerra maps each emitted finding to the applicable Part-6 § clause, so an auditor can trace every report row back to an objective. Excerpt of the mapping below - full table is in resources/compliance/ISO_26262_2018.json.

Part 6 clauseObjectiveRequired at ASILPhantomYerra detector
§ 5.4.7Defensive programmingA / B / C / D (rec)YerraSAST defensive-programming rule pack (uninitialised read, null deref, integer overflow, unchecked return value)
§ 5.4.7Boundary-value checksB / C / D (req)YerraSAST array-bounds + buffer-overflow rule pack with inter-procedural taint
§ 7.4.10Restricted scope of variablesA / B / C / D (rec)YerraCPP global-variable + cross-TU symbol-leak detector
§ 7.4.10Use of language subsetB / C / D (req)MISRA C 2023 + MISRA C++ 2023 + AUTOSAR C++14 packs (340 + 519 = 859 rules)
§ 7.4.10Strong typingA / B / C / D (rec)YerraSAST implicit-conversion + signedness-conversion detectors
§ 7.4.13One entry / one exit per subprogramC / D (rec)YerraCPP multi-exit detector
§ 7.4.13No dynamic objects / variables (or check before use)C / D (req)YerraCPP dynamic-allocation detector (malloc / new / make_shared)
§ 7.4.13No unconditional jumpsB / C / D (req)YerraCPP goto / longjmp detector
§ 7.4.13No recursionC / D (req)YerraCPP inter-procedural recursion detector (direct + indirect via call graph)
§ 8.4.4Configuration management of source codeA / B / C / D (req)Workspace-bound source SHA-256 attestation, signed by sidecar key
§ 8.4.5Static code analysisA / B / C / D (req)YerraSAST scan with cross-tool corroboration (CodeQL + Semgrep + bundled analyzers)
§ 8.4.5Semantic code analysisC / D (req)YerraSAST inter-procedural taint engine + symbolic execution paths
§ 8.4.5Walk-throughA / B (req)Audit log of human review actions per finding
§ 8.4.5InspectionC / D (req)Per-finding signoff workflow with reviewer identity recorded
§ 9.4.2Software-unit verificationA / B / C / D (req)Per-source-file verification report generated automatically
§ 9.4.2Boundary-value testingB / C / D (req)YerraFuzz boundary-value fuzzer for unit functions
§ 9.4.3Coverage metrics - statementA / B / C / D (rec)YerraSAST scan-coverage report (per-file, per-function, per-line)
§ 9.4.3Coverage metrics - branchB / C / D (req)YerraFuzz branch-coverage reporter (gcov / llvm-cov compatible)
§ 9.4.3Coverage metrics - MC/DCC / D (rec/req)YerraFuzz MC/DC reporter for ASIL D code
§ 10.4.2Integration testingA / B / C / D (req)DAST + IAST scan correlation with SAST evidence
§ 11.4Verification of safety requirementsA / B / C / D (req)PhantomYerra audit-ready report engine produces DOCX / PDF / JSON evidence pack

"rec" = recommended at this ASIL; "req" = required. PhantomYerra's default policy fires its detector at every level that lists either, so the operator can review whether the rec/req split for their project matches.

Tool qualification

T2 Confidence.
TCL2 / TD3.

ISO 26262 Part 8 § 11 requires that any software tool used during the development of a safety-critical item be qualified for use. PhantomYerra is delivered with a Tool Qualification Kit (TQK) covering tool classification (T1 / T2 / T3), tool confidence level (TCL1 / TCL2 / TCL3), and the per-version qualification evidence the auditor reviews.

TQK sectionDocumentPurpose
A - Tool classificationTool Classification Statement (TCS)Establishes PhantomYerra as a T2 tool - used during development but its output is verified by other means (review, test, cross-tool).
B - Tool confidence levelTool Confidence Statement (TCS-Lvl)Establishes TCL2 (medium confidence) per ISO 26262-8 § 11.4.5 - supported by cross-tool corroboration evidence.
C - Tool error analysisTool Error Analysis (TEA)Documents the known failure modes of every YerraSAST detector (false-positive rate, false-negative rate, known limitations).
D - Tool qualification evidenceTool Qualification Report (TQR)Per-version evidence pack: regression test results, deviation log, change log against the previous qualified version.
E - User manualSafety ManualDocuments the constraints under which PhantomYerra may be used as a qualified tool (declared input domain, declared output usage).
F - Audit packAuditor WalkthroughPre-built script the auditor can run to reproduce qualification evidence on the customer's own bench.
Workflow

From ASIL Decl.
To Sign-Off.

A typical ASIL-D engagement on a safety-critical ECU uses the PhantomYerra workspace as the single source of truth: ASIL declaration, scan, deviation register, signoff log, qualification certificate, audit pack - all produced from the same finding store, same workspace state.

StepActivityArtifact
01Item architecture & ASIL declaration - the operator declares each component's ASIL in the workspaceItem architecture YAML
02Configure scanner policy - workspace selects ASIL-driven detector thresholds (block / fail / inform)Workspace policy JSON
03Scan source tree - YerraSAST + MISRA + AUTOSAR + CERT packs all run in a single passMulti-framework finding stream
04Cross-tool corroborate - bundled CodeQL + Semgrep verify high-confidence findingsCross-tool confidence ranking
05Per-finding ASIL grade - each finding gets the containing component's ASIL automaticallyASIL-graded finding store
06Deviation register - accepted deviations recorded with rationale + reviewer signatureDeviation log (signed)
07Verification report - DOCX / PDF report listing every Part-6 objective + every finding that satisfies / violates itAudit-ready package
08Tool qualification certificate - TQK rendered with the project's version pins + scan IDTQK signed PDF
How PhantomYerra exceeds Coverity on ISO 26262

Both vendors ship T2 / TCL2 tool qualification kits with ASIL A-D support. Where PhantomYerra exceeds: (1) automatic per-finding ASIL grading driven by workspace item-architecture declarations - Coverity requires manual annotation; (2) single-scan multi-framework finding stream - one scan produces MISRA + AUTOSAR + CERT + ISO 26262 evidence simultaneously, no separate runs; (3) cross-tool corroboration baked into the TCL2 confidence story - Coverity's confidence claim relies on its single engine; (4) air-gapped tool qualification - the entire TQK pack can be reproduced offline on the customer's bench, which simplifies certification at high-security suppliers; (5) perpetual licence pricing, which makes long-term safety-tool budget predictable across multi-year platform programs.

Honest scope: ISO 26262 tool qualification is shipped as a kit; an actual independent assessor's certification stamp is the customer's responsibility and depends on their bench setup. PhantomYerra provides the artefacts; the auditor signs.

Related standards

Pair It With.